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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
MORTGAGE LOANSAND FINANCIAL SECURITYAMONG MIDDLE-AGEDAND
OLDERAMERICANS
Mortgage loan debt is prevalent among middle-aged and older Americans. With higher
average outstanding balances, many people are unlikely to pay off their mortgage debt by
retirement. Meanwhile, as people age, health shocks are more likely to occur. Medical ex-
pensesmay competewithmortgage payments and relate to financial insecurity in later years.
In order to alleviate financial strain during times of financial hardship, senior homeowners
may find reverse mortgage the solution they are looking for. TargetingAmerican adults age
50 and older, this dissertation investigates mortgage loan debt and financial security using
panel data from the Health and Retirement Study. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this
dissertation and three studies. Chapter 2 investigates whether retirement preparedness plays
a role in mortgage status at retirement, shown here as whether a person has mortgage debt
and how much the remaining balance is (Waves 2004-2014). Chapter 3 examines health
impact on likelihood of paying off mortgage loans under different health conditions, with
estimates on expected time to mortgage payoff (Waves 2004-2014). Chapter 4 focuses on
reverse mortgages and their impact on senior borrowers’ financial satisfaction and liquidity
constraint (Waves 2010-2016). Chapter 5 summarizes major findings in three studies and
highlights the contribution of this dissertation toward middle-aged and older Americans’
financial security. Limitations of three studies are discussed in Chapter 6. Three stud-
ies provide evidence on 1) the importance of preparedness on reduced mortgage burden;
2) adverse impact of health shock on likelihood of mortgage payoff; and 3) using reverse
mortgages to reduce financial strain and increase financial satisfaction. Implications are
addressed in each study.
KEYWORDS: Mortgage Loans, Retirement Preparedness, Health Shock, Reverse Mort-
gage, Financial Satisfaction
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CHAPTER 1. DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
This dissertation focuses on mortgage loans and financial security among American
adults age 50 and older. Aiming to promote middle-aged and older adults’ financial secu-
rity, and therefore, their overall wellbeing, three issues pertaining to managing mortgage
debts are examined. Bringing mortgage loan debts into focus, three research questions
closely relate to financial challenges that face older people: lack of retirement planning
before retired, declining health with aging, and lack of financial resources in retirement.
Adopting a three-chapter format, each study is allocated to address one pressing issue re-
lated to mortgage loans that middle-aged and older Americans encounter.
1.1 Retirement as a New Life Stage
For many retirees, retirement means leisure and freedom; for others, however, it brings
financial challenges. With traditional defined-benefit plans, individuals usually have little
control over their pension benefits. Of course, they could choose to work longer, but mostly,
employers take care of employees’ retirement benefits. Since the late 1970s, with the shift
from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, employees have had more choices
in managing their own savings and investments. Apart from employers’ matching contribu-
tions, an employee makes the decision on whether he or she saves and when to begin saving.
While the current retirement system grants more opportunities to accrue lifetime wealth, it
also stresses individual responsibility and imposes challenges in retirement planning.
Retirement planning outcome, unfortunately, is not satisfying. Many employees are
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unprepared and underprepared, which results in low personal savings and high unsecured
and secured debts. Inadequate savings manifest in limited resources in retirement, while
leveraging infers competing financial needs from debt payments in later years. Due to
insufficient resources and financial needs to sustain retirement life, today’s middle-aged
and older people are more vulnerable to liquidity constraint and financial insecurity.
In order to promote financial wellbeing in later years, research on household resource
management has kept pace with these pressing issues. Regarding low savings, extensive
studies elucidate why people do not save, from the financial, cognitive or behavioral per-
spectives. With abundant empirical evidence, strategies are implemented to motivate per-
sonal savings. A typical example is the retirement seminar, an educational scheme that
is widely used in companies, nonprofit organizations and education institutions, aiming to
inform employees of the importance of saving for retirement and to teach them how to save.
Parallel with savings and investment is research on debt, specifically, debt impact on
older adults’ financial wellbeing. Empirical evidence in this area is fruitful, yielding find-
ings on debt demand, debt attitude and debt managing behaviors. In the last decade, studies
have advanced by incorporating health problems—a prevailing issue facing older people
—to examine how certain health conditions—for example, chronic disease or acute health
shocks—influence older people’s net worth and leveraging, and ultimately their financial
security in retirement.
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1.2 A Brief on Three Studies
Among all types of debt, mortgages are a segment constituting the largest share of house-
hold debt balance. Due to changes in lifestyle, people now tend to delay first-time home
buying. Low interest rates back in the 2000s have been an incentive to purchasing larger
homes. While mortgages allow people to afford a home earlier, in the long run, they may
become a financial burden when people approach retirement. As commonly seen, many
near-retirees cannot pay off their mortgage debts at retirement and will have to continue
mortgage payments in retirement, when living primarily on Social Security income. Given
low savings, having mortgage debts in later years is a financial issue that calls for more
attention.
Considering the prevalence of mortgage debts among near-retirees and retired home-
owners, it is important to ask why some people are able to pay off mortgage loans before
they retire whereas others cannot. Is it because they are not well prepared for retirement, or
they simply do not know that they should prepare for it? Prior research indicates prepared-
ness promotes wealth growth. When focusing on mortgage debts, does preparedness still
play a role?
Second, health declines with aging. Older adults are more vulnerable to health shocks
and on average have more chronic diseases. Earlier studies show health impact on increased
unsecured debts. Mortgage debts and their relationship with health, however, are relatively
under-studied. With rising healthcare costs and longevity, when a mortgagor has chronic
illnesses or experiences health shocks, would mortgage payoff be deterred by health prob-
lems; and if so, how likely? Furthermore, under different health conditions, what is an
3
expected time for them to pay down mortgage debts?
Third, resource inadequacy is prevalent among seniors, and thus, older people have
demands for extra income to fund living expenses in retirement. Theoretically, home eq-
uity may be released as supplemental income. A reverse mortgage allows homeowners
beyond age 62 to access their home equity. Through releasing equity, older people have
additional liquid assets to pay living expenses. Although there is empirical evidence using
macroeconomic data, in the real world few seniors choose reverse mortgages for smoothing
consumption. Given this disparity, it is important to understand whether a reverse mortgage
is helpful with improving a senior borrower’s financial situation.
Taken together, for the population of American adults age 50 and older, in explain-
ing their mortgage- managing behaviors and decisions, Study 1 focuses on preparedness,
addressing the advantage of planning before onset of retirement for a less financially stress-
ful retirement. Study 2 is an accession to Study 1, showing the negative impact of health
shock—an unexpected life event that could happen to anyone including mortgagors ap-
proaching retirement or retired people—suggesting that mortgage payoff could be hindered
by health shock. Both studies provide insights into strategically managing mortgages as a
rational consumer, reducing financial burdens frommortgage debt and maximizing lifetime
satisfaction.
As people age, they become more vulnerable to insufficient resource and tightened bud-
gets, which are revealed as higher demands to liquidate home equity to sustain an accept-
able standard of living. Study 3, therefore, seeks solutions to mitigate liquidity constraint
resulting from lack of resources. Its focus is the reverse mortgage, a financial product that
functions in a similar way to a home equity line of credit but is only available to adults age
4
62 and older. Use of reverse mortgage could help relieve seniors’ financial strain, which
needs examining the impact of reverse mortgage on borrowers’ financial situations. Re-
sults are likely to inform researchers and educators of practical insights into older people’s
wealth management.
In all, these three studies share a core concept of mortgage loans, while separately ad-
dressing their relationship with retirement preparedness, health impact, and effect of re-
verse mortgage on financial satisfaction, weaving into a dissertation that covers time peri-
ods before the beginning of retirement, transition to retirement and retirement life. Overall,
the three studies contribute to the mortgage loan literature and gerontological studies by
showing the importance of 1) properly managing mortgage debts through preparedness; 2)
shielding against negative impact from health shock; and 3) attaining potential financial
satisfaction from reverse mortgages.
Longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) are used for statistical
analyses in three studies. The HRS began to collect data onAmericans over age 50 biannu-
ally since 1992. Essential information used in this dissertation is repeatedly collected, in-
cluding household assets, debt, retirement planning and physical and psychological health.
Selection of waves for analyses depend on availability of main variables.
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of components of older people’s wellbeing in retire-
ment. It illustrates pathways connecting financial resource management, financial security
and eventually financial satisfaction. Bold words highlight the focus of each study.
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Figure 1.1: Components of Older Adults’ Wellbeing in Retirement.
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1.3 Background
1.3.1 The Life-Cycle Hypothesis on Demand for Mortgage Loans
The classical economic model of the life-cycle hypothesis suggests that, for a ratio-
nal consumer with perfect knowledge on the market, debt demand is determined by age
and life time resources. Across life stages, keeping constant marginal utility is crucial to
smoothing consumption and lifetime utility maximization. In working years, income ex-
ceeds consumption, resulting in surplus, and then wealth grows, part of it going toward debt
payment. Wealth peaks at retirement and debts are expected to be paid off by retirement.
Wealth is distributed through remaining years to maintain the same standard of living.
Buying a home is an important financial decision. For people at different life stages,
home purchase has different meanings. Before midlife, buying a home signifies “settling
down” and “establishing a family.” With mortgage payments, a buyer pays interest and
principal and thus, accrues home equity over time. Home equity remains the biggest share
of household assets for people approaching retirement, functioning mainly as buffer capital
to guard against financial shocks. Of course, a buyer could pay cash should he or she have
enough funds. In most cases, however, people use mortgages to finance home buying.
A mortgage loan is a type of debt secured by housing property. Homebuyers borrow
from lenders to buy a house with the promise to repay both principal and interest (using
future income) within a certain timeframe. Before applying for a mortgage, saving for down
payment is almost always necessary. Upon obtaining the loan, the financial obligation of
making on-time payments becomes a priority.
From the life-cycle hypothesis perspective, when current income is lower than its pro-
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portional life time income, borrowing is needed to keep consumption level constant across
the lifespan. People in early or mid-adulthood who earn entry salaries are likely to be in
such a situation. Therefore, when a person is in his or her earlier working years, a mortgage
makes home buying affordable for now—through borrowing against future income.
Understandably, when making a home buying decision, it is recommended to take an
affordable mortgage relative to earned income, so that a mortgagor will not feel stress from
mortgage payments in the long run. Ideally, when retirement approaches, mortgages are
expected to be paid down. Retirement is the time when wealth peaks, and the source of
income switches from earned income to unearned income such as fixed Social Security
benefits and pensions. In other words, wealth accumulated in working years is carried over
into retirement, and then is spent to maintain a similar standard of living that a person had
when employed. When necessary, home equity may be released to pay living expenses and
to smooth consumption for utility maximization.
1.3.2 Mortgage Debt among Middle-Aged and Older Americans
In recent years, concerns have been aroused by middle-aged and older Americans’ high
mortgage debts and their higher outstanding balances than earlier cohorts. Mortgages ac-
count for nearly half of older adults’ total debt balance and remain Americans’ biggest
household debt over the last decade. About 40% of Americans do not pay off their mort-
gage balances, averaging $75,000, when they retire. In 2010, among borrowers ages 57
to 61, outstanding mortgage balance averaged $74,602, representing 264% over the 1992
cohort.
Holding mortgages in retirement has ramifications. When a pre-retiree has mortgage
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debts, tradeoff between mortgage payment and retirement savings has to be made. Gen-
erally, mortgage payment as a financial obligation to repay debts is given higher priority
than saving. Therefore, it is common to see saving deterred by mortgage payments among
near-retirees. In addition, having mortgage debt lowers older people’s quality of life in
retirement. When a big share of monthly income is allocated for debt payment, disposal
income that could be used to cover daily expenses is reduced. This is when an older person
experiences a tightened budget. In this situation, older adults are unlikely to sustain the
standard of living that they had when they were employed. As a result, they must cut back
on living expenses to repay mortgage debts or to strategically reduce their mortgage loan
balances.
Ample studies have sought explanations on heavy mortgages among middle-aged and
older Americans. Factors identified include market incentives, low financial literacy and
evaporation of home equity from the Great Recession. For example, over the last thirty
years, mortgage interest rates gradually decreased from approximately 12.0% in the 1980s
to around 4.5% in the first quarter of 2017. Low interest rates are an incentive to home pur-
chasing. While lower interest rates permit many Americans to buy their own homes, they
may experience financial burden if their loan is unaffordable given their current and future
income. Sadly, many consumers are not able to foresee financial hardships resulting from
mortgages when retirement is about to begin. Meanwhile, low financial literacy results in
high-cost borrowing or confusion about mortgage terms. Finally, home equity that plum-
meted in the aftermath of the Great Recession results in loss in total household or personal
wealth.
9
1.3.3 Lack of Resources in Retirement
Another factor inflicting insecurity on older people’s financial situation is lack of fi-
nancial resources, in both domains of Social Security benefits and personal savings and
pensions. The function of the Social Security system is to maintain older adults’ basic stan-
dard of living. That said, living only on Social Security income is unlikely to fully cover
total living expenses should an older person wish to have the same quality of life that he had
in his working years. For example, Social Security benefits averaged $1,409 in 2018 for a
single worker retired at age 65. Meanwhile, approximately $1,257 was spent on housing-
related items, including mortgage payments, compared with $434 spent by mortgage-free
homeowners. These numbers straightforwardly inform us that, when havingmortgage debts
in retirement, Social Security benefits alone are not enough to repay debts.
Apart from Social Security benefits, personal savings is not promising. For Americans
ages 51-56, all savings accounts included—for instance, an Individual Retirement Account
or 401(k)—median savings was $47,500. In other words, nearly half of pre-retirees have
savings below $47,500. Retirees, taking ages 61-75 as an example, have drastically lower
median savings, at $14,000.
1.3.4 Declining Health with Aging
Deterioration in health status faces the retired population, resulting in higher medical
expenses and healthcare costs, which competes with financial needs from consumption and
debt repayment. According to reports from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in 2016, the proportion of older Americans with chronic disease was high: about 45.7%
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of older adults had one chronic condition. Two in three had two or more types of chronic
illnesses. Chronic disease usually requires continuous medical attention over a long period
of time. As a leading cause of death, chronic illnesses require treatment and maintenance
that accounts for 90% of older adults’ annual healthcare costs after adjusting for health in-
surance reimbursement. Depending on the number and severity of health conditions, older
adults’ out-of-pocket expenses on chronic disease are between $1,000 and $2,000. In addi-
tion, about 10% of older Americans do not have any health insurance, and their healthcare
costs are on average substantially higher than their insured counterparts.
Aside from chronic diseases, middle-aged and older adults are more likely to experi-
ence unexpected health events, or health shock. For example, about 15% of adults before
age 60 have unanticipated falls or surgeries severe enough to force them to temporarily
withdraw from work. This implies that what comes with health shocks can include forgone
salaries. Health shocks generate large out-of-pocket expenses, which is also unexpected
when a household lacks emergency funds. The onset of one severe health event is esti-
mated to bring out-of-pocket expenses as high as $17,000. To conclude, health shocks,
chronic illnesses and medical expenses threaten older people’s financial security.
Overall, in connection with mortgage burdens discussed above, in later life financial
needs from healthcare and mortgage payments compete. Reconciling financial demands
from mortgage payments and medical expenses is crucial for financial security.
1.3.5 Home Equity as an Additional Source of Income
Older adults’ wealth primarily comprises assets in two forms: financial assets and home
equity. As discussed above, financial assets alone, including Social Security benefits and
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personal savings, are insufficient to pay daily expenses. Home equity at this point becomes
increasingly important in times of financial difficulties in later years. For example, adults
ages 62-75 have median savings of $14,000, whereas their home equity has a median of
$115,000. This financial situation is called “house rich, cash poor,” a condition that is com-
mon among senior homeowners. The problem with home equity is that, when financial
shocks occur, it may not be quickly released and converted into cash, because a home sale
takes time. In other words, many older adults, although they have a home and some savings,
still feel financially pressured to sustain a comfortable life in retirement. To help resolve
this financial problem, home equity, if released and used rationally, would enhance older
adults’ quality of life. In addition, using one’s own wealth to fund retirement reduces de-
pendence on social welfare and financial help-seeking, bringing independence and a sense
of autonomy.
Applying classical economic theory to real life, financial products are available for
homeowners to release equity, including reverse mortgages. A reverse mortgage is a type
of home equity loan for homeowners beyond age 62. Taking the loan, homeowners borrow
against their own equity and receive payments from the lender. On average, a borrower
releases a maximum of 80% of their home equity through a reverse mortgage.
Despite economic benefits that are documented in the literature, few seniors use reverse
mortgages. Some older people are prudent about tapping into home equity, even if they
need additional income. From the perspective of the life-cycle hypothesis, home equity
accumulated throughmortgage payments is wealth accrued in working years. If allocated to
retirement, when income is low, it helps to maintain the same consumption level throughout
life stages and to maximize lifetime satisfaction.
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1.4 Research Questions
Problems relating to middle-aged and older Americans’ financial security have been
briefly discussed, including mortgage debt burdens, limited financial resources, financial
impact from declining health and demand for home equity for additional income. This
dissertation intends to help promote financial security in later years. Using mortgage debts
as a thread, three studies are connected, each examining one aspect of unpreparedness,
health impact and effect of reverse mortgage loans.
1.4.1 Study 1
When asked why many people could not pay off their mortgage before or at retirement,
we rely on the assumption that people have knowledge that a mortgage should be paid down
before onset of retirement. What if this assumption does not hold true for most mortgagors?
Maybe a fundamental question that is overlooked is: do mortgagors know they should plan
for their own retirement and manage mortgages as an important part in retirement planning?
In other words, many people carrymortgage debts into later years because they almost never
thought about retirement. Thus, insight into the role of retirement planning and prepared-
ness on mortgage status is imperatively needed.
Research question. The first study examines the impact of retirement preparedness on
mortgage status at retirement, shown as whether a near-retiree or retired person has any
mortgage loan and, if they carry mortgage debt into retirement, how is the amount of the
mortgage loan balance related to their retirement preparedness level?
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1.4.2 Study 2
Declining health is an important segment in gerontology studies. Efforts have been
made to link health to debts. Earlier research in this realm focuses on financial outcomes
from health problems, for example incurrence of consumer debt. In recent years, mortgages
constituting the largest share of household debt receive increasing attention. Nevertheless,
more studies could be done in terms of health impact on mortgage loan status, so as to
motivate older people to speed up mortgage payments before health shocks occur.
Research question. To enrich the literature, Study 2 bridges mortgage loans and health
shock, investigating 1) how likely health shocks deter mortgage payment, shown as reduced
likelihood ofmortgage payoff; and 2) estimated expected time to payment completion under
different health conditions.
1.4.3 Study 3
Once retired, most people switch from earned income to unearned fixed income. Since
Social Security benefits are generally insufficient to meet financial needs, an older person
may choose to utilize personal savings and pensions to maintain a base level of consump-
tion. In the long run, one consequence is wealth exhaustion and budget constraint. To live
comfortably, seniors may be forced to tap into home equity to buffer against lack of income.
Reverse mortgages, a financial tool allowing older homeowner access to equity, theoreti-
cally provide a potential to mitigate the problems. It enables intertemporal resource transfer
of equity accrued earlier in life to retirement, helping to maintain the same consumption
level in retirement years and to maximize borrowers’ lifetime satisfaction. Despite benefit
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potentials, in reality, reverse mortgages are not widely accepted or commonly used among
qualified older homeowners. Empirically, little is known about their effectiveness on miti-
gating budget constraint.
Research question. Study 3 examines the impact of reverse mortgages on changes in
financial satisfaction, with quantifications on the impact: specifically, whether a reverse
mortgage increases a borrower’s financial satisfaction and decreases liquidity constraint,
and by how much.
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
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CHAPTER 2. RETIRINGWITH NOMORTGAGE DEBT: THE ROLE OF
PREPAREDNESS
2.1 Abstract
Mortgage loans were usually planned to be paid off by retirement. However, recent
trends showed that manyAmerican near-retirees were unlikely to pay off mortgages by the
time they retired, inflicting financial insecurity in later years. Previous studies identified
predictors of holdingmortgage debt among older homeowners. Yet a basic question remain-
ing unanswered was whether pre-retirees had thought about retirement, a key to retirement
planning. This study focused onAmericans over age 50 and investigated whether retirement
preparedness was a predictor of their mortgage status at retirement. Two specific questions
were asked: what was the impact of retirement preparedness on whether a homeowner had
a mortgage loan; and, in case they carried mortgage debt into retirement, how was the mort-
gage balance related to preparedness and to what extent? Six biannual waves (2004-2014)
of the Health and Retirement Studies were used. Results showed that near-retirees who
“prepared a lot” were 25% less likely to continue holding mortgages than those who re-
ported “hardly at all” in preparedness. Non-retired mortgagors’ LTV ratio was reduced by
0.02 (i.e., 2% of average home value). Implications for deleveraging in retirement planning
were addressed.
Keywords: retirement preparedness, mortgage loans, middle-aged and olderAmericans
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2.2 Introduction
Many middle-aged and older Americans had one or more types of debt [75]. Among
other debts, mortgage loans as a key drive to higher household leveraging accounted for
approximately half of older adults’ debt balance [59, 113]. Between 2001 and 2011, the
number of homeowners over age 65 who had mortgage loans increased from 22% to 30%.
The average mortgage loan balance reportedly nearly doubled from $43,300 to $79,000
[29]. From the classical economic point of view, mortgage loans allowed people to afford a
home in times of low income or insufficient savings. A mortgage was presumed to be paid
off by retirement when wealth peaked [10, 85]. Against theoretical predictions, we have
seen many near-retirees lagging behind the suggested timing of mortgage payoff, implying
that they had to carry mortgage loans into retirement, when people lived primarily on Social
Security benefits, pensions and savings [75]. Considering that Social Security income and
low savings may not fully cover retirees’ living expenses, mortgages could compete with
other financial needs, resulting in financial pressure and financial difficulty.
Previous studies seeking explanations of holdingmortgages among near-retirees and the
retired examined domains of economics, behavior and cognition, revealing that the decision
on carrying the loan related to low savings (i.e., smaller down payment), luxury lifestyle
(e.g., larger home) [79] and financial illiteracy (e.g., high-cost borrowing) [86]. Ideally,
as stipulated in the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses, paying down a mortgage
by retirement was essential to keeping marginal utility constant and to maximizing lifetime
satisfaction within limited resources. The reality that consumers had limited knowledge
on rationally managing debts made this financial goal hard to achieve. Truly, completing
17
mortgage payments by retirement was a complex financial task. Mortgagors should set a
financial goal, undertake appropriate actions and evaluate strategies over at least a decade.
More importantly, this goal was suggested to be completed before retirement, so that debtors
had enough time to make adjustments where necessary [7]. Hence, awareness of retirement
was a prerequisite to preparedness and planning. Without such recognition, the propensity
for carelessness about retirement could deter mortgage debt management, giving rise to
undesirable financial outcomes. That was why we asked whether debtors were mindful of
retirement and whether that awareness was related to a “mortgage-free” retirement life.
The concept of preparedness was not new to personal finance. The use of retirement
preparedness to understand recognition of retirement and planning behaviors was docu-
mented as early as the 1980s [47,60]. Recently, Lusardi and Mitchell [77] found a positive
association between retirement preparedness and wealth at older ages. Despite this evi-
dence, “preparedness” needed to extend its application to household finance. Considering
the inability of many American near-retirees and retired people to pay down mortgages
in time, it was important to explore if preparedness played a role in mortgage loan status.
TargetingAmerican adults over age 50, this study investigated the question whether an indi-
vidual’s mortgage loan status was an effect of preparedness. The primary research question
came down to two specific questions: was retirement preparedness related to whether a
near-retiree or retired person had a mortgage loan; and, if they carried mortgage debt into
retirement, was the amount of the mortgage loan balance related to preparedness, and by
how much? Six biannual waves (2004-2014) of the Health and Retirement Studies (HRS)
were used to investigate the questions. Findings denoted considerations on mortgage loan
handling strategies and research potentials.
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2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Mortgage Debt among Middle-Aged and Older Americans
Mortgage loans constituted the largest portion of debt balance among middle-aged and
older Americans [41]. Multiple studies reported increases both in the percentage of those
who had mortgages and their average outstanding balance [69,88]. In 2011, about one third
(30%) of homeowners over age 65 had mortgages, 1.3 times higher than the percentage in
2001 (22%) [28]. By age group, mortgagors accounted for 43% (ages 55-64), 30% (ages 65-
74) and 14% (age 75+) [14]. Homeowners age 75 and older experienced the largest percent
growth in mortgage debt: more than twofold from 2001 (8.4%) to 2011 (21.2%) [115].
Parallel with the substantial increase in percentage of those holding mortgages was
the rising mortgage loan balance. In 2010, among borrowers ages 57 to 61, the outstand-
ing mortgage balance averaged $74,602, representing 264% and 133% growth over 1992
($28,221) and 2004 ($56,066)1, respectively [75]. In addition to loan balance, another dis-
tinction between current and earlier cohorts was the ever-increasing loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio. The median LTV ratio surged from 5% in 1992 to 30% in 2010 [30], suggesting
higher leveraging in today’s middle-aged and older mortgagors.
2.3.2 Mortgage Burdens in Retirement
Considerable research showed that many middle-aged and older Americans endured
competing financial needs. Commonly seen were consumer debt and healthcare costs. For
instance, Americans ages 62 to 67 had an average credit card debt of $4,948 and an an-
1Lusardi et al. made an inflation adjustment to 2010 U.S. dollar values.
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nual out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expense of $2,251 [37]. As high as consumer debt and
healthcare costs were, the amount of savings was not promising. About 45% of near-retirees
had no retirement savings despite incentives such as employers’ “matching strategy” [5].
Apart from savings and investment, another important segment of lifetime wealth—home
equity—tumbled in the aftermath of the Great Recession. On average, home values dropped
by 13.8% with the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008 [83]. Therefore, financial needs
and inadequate resources remained two burdens that many older Americans had to handle.
It was conceivable that, in transition to retirement, living on limited wealth could be
unsustainable in the long run. For any near-retiree or retired person, financial standing may
be harmed by unpaid mortgage loans. For example, according to the Social Security Ad-
ministration [105], older individuals with mortgage loans spent approximately $1,257 per
month on housing services, compared with $434 by mortgage-free homeowners. Consider-
ing that Social Security benefits averaged $1,409 (as of March 2018), mortgage payments
evidently took up a sizeable portion of, or even exhausted, an older individual’s disposable
income.
Burdens from living costs along with mortgage loans imposed negative ramifications
on a near-retiree or retired person’s wellbeing. Financially, it was documented that middle-
aged and older mortgagors had less access to financial services. For example, they were
less likely to get approval on a home equity line of credit when LTV ratio was high [88]. In
addition, as a good portion of income went to mortgage payments, middle-aged and older
borrowers had to face opportunity cost, forgoing savings, investment and capital growth
from compound interest [8]. Psychologically, older mortgagors were weary of their finan-
cial situation, reporting lower financial satisfaction [102], feeling the pressure from on-
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time payment [39]. Indeed, compared with younger counterparts, middle-aged and older
mortgagors were more likely to be delinquent or in default and to go through foreclosure.
Unsurprisingly, losing a home at older ages was found to be traumatic, manifesting in low
appetite [3], emotion instability [62,68] and frequent and severe depressive symptoms [17].
2.3.3 Factors Impeding Mortgage Payoff by Retirement
Research on postponement of mortgage payoff provided a series of explanations. From
a demographic viewpoint, racial minorities, larger family size, poorer health and consumer
debt were found to be associated with having mortgage debt as a retiree [65]. Financial il-
literacy also played a role in cognition. For example, deficiency in understanding mortgage
contracts was a hurdle to timely payment [13]. Low literacywas also a predictor of high-cost
borrowing [109]. This was particularly found among mortgagors choosing adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARM), where future payments tended to rise due to higher interest rates [32].
This situation inflicted risk of lapsed payments and the possibility of defaulting on a mort-
gage loan [45]. In addition to high-cost borrowing and the perils of default, financially
illiterate borrowers were less likely to take advantage of lower interest rates in the market
or to seize the optimum time to refinance, thus missing the opportunity to accelerate their
payment progress [1].
In sum, mortgage burdens among middle-aged and older Americans received more at-
tention in recent years. Ramifications of holding mortgage debt in near- and post-retirement
years were consequential, given competing needs and limited wealth. Explanations on jeop-
ardized payment process produced informative evidence. Yet a deeper understanding was
needed regarding why people nearing retirement carried mortgage debt, if consequences
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were shown to be detrimental. Hitherto, a fundamental question that may provide further
explanation pertained to awareness of the beginning of retirement, a prerequisite to financial
planning including deleveraging. In other words, was it crucial to think about retirement
beforehand? To add to the literature, this paper focused onAmerican middle-aged and older
mortgagors, investigating if retirement preparedness had an impact on whether an individ-
ual could pay off mortgage debt by retirement. If payments could not be completed when
retired, we further asked how remaining mortgage balance was related to preparedness and
to what extent.
2.3.4 Link Retirement Preparedness to Mortgage Status
Preparedness. “Preparedness” was defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as be-
ing ready for a situation, or the state of being prepared. With regard to personal finance, am-
ple research showed its impact on financial behavior and financial outcomes. For example,
retirement preparedness was predictive of ownership of pension and/or savings plans [57],
better saving outcomes [81] and self-reported retirement readiness [61]. Preparedness was
also found to be associated with proactive adjustments to transition to retirement, both fi-
nancially and psychologically [9,118]. In a nutshell, empirical evidence almost consistently
suggested that retirement preparedness promoted financial and psychological wellbeing
among older Americans. In recent years, the focus of research shifted to explore determi-
nants of preparedness; in other words, what attributes were related to higher preparedness.
Although not as fruitful, some studies yielded informative evidence. For example, antici-
pated retirement age influenced the timing of retirement planning, while higher quality of
planning was affected by time preference for the future [26].
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Mortgage and retirement preparedness. A mortgage loan was a product to finance
home buying. Mortgages denoted different meanings for people at different life stages.
For individuals in young and early mid-adulthood, mortgages made it affordable for these
people to purchase a home. Their current level of savings was usually lower than needed to
pay for a house, so borrowing against future income was needed to smooth consumption.
Understandably, it was not urgent for borrowers in earlier life stages to pay off a mortgage,
since retirement was still in the far future.
As people aged, retirement planning became a major financial task; age 50 was a con-
ventional benchmark, suggesting that preparation for retirement was now imperative [16].
Defying the guideline, many Americans were not getting ready for retirement at that age.
Managing mortgage loans, a topic that was more complex than savings or investment, was
paid even less attention.
When a near-retiree planned for a debt-free retired life, a workable approach was to
accelerate mortgage payment so as to shorten the payment timeframe, paying down a mort-
gage ahead of the contracted schedule. To achieve this goal, one strategy was to increase the
monthly payment. Through raising the payment, a mortgagor had two benefits: shortening
the mortgage life and saving on total interest. In fact, simply by adding $100 to a monthly
payment of a 30-year $100,000 loan at a 4.5% interest rate, the loan would be paid off eight
years earlier, along with saving $26,300 on interest. These financial actions required careful
planning: for example, adjusting one’s budget. The preceding step was a decisive goal to
get prepared for retirement. On the contrary, lacking the mindset of getting ready to tran-
sition to retirement, a mortgagor was less likely to endeavor to reduce debt. Consequently,
with little-to-no preparedness, he may also be less likely to proactively manage mortgage
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loans, such as by calculating the interest or searching for information on the current housing
market. Therefore, retirement preparedness was postulated to speed up payoff by increasing
mortgage payment.
Next, in addition to raising payments, an alternative approach to accelerate mortgage
payoff was to reduce the remaining balance. Downsizing was a feasible plan. Through
switching to a smaller house, mortgage loan balance was likely to decrease, along with
property tax and the cost of homeowner’s insurance. A third possible approach to reduc-
ing financial burden was to defray monthly payments. For example, turning the residential
home into a rental home, with rents paying themortgage. Since for most people it was a seri-
ous decision to transform a home to a shared property, the decision-making and inception of
these actions may not be implemented unless an individual held the philosophy of planning
for a financially stable retirement. Without conscious awareness or preparedness, people
nearing retirement may not be motivated to maneuver mortgage debt. Therefore, retirement
preparedness was assumed to accelerate mortgage payoff by reducing the remaining loan
balance or defraying monthly payments.
Fourth, preparation for retirement could also be enhanced by refinancing, a means to
acquire a new loan with more favorable interest and contracted terms, for example, switch-
ing from an adjusted-rate mortgage to a fixed-rate one. Please note that, in order to qualify
for refinancing, a home appraisal was necessary (usually by a disinterested third party) to
get the home value. So, at the borrower’s end, good condition of the house was critical to
obtain a fair interest rate from the refinance. This was related to retirement preparation,
as people who were mindful about managing mortgage debt through refinancing may have
paid more attention to home maintenance to avoid value deflation. Therefore, retirement
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preparedness was presumed to be related to refinancing for a favorable interest rate and loan
balance.
Lastly, getting ready for retirement may also be reflected in quick remedial actions in
case of payment difficulty. As mentioned earlier, older adults tended to have higher delin-
quent and default rates [3]. When payment disruption occurred, it generally took longer for
older people to get back on track [74]. Given these findings, those who were prepared for
retirement were likely to actively shield perils of default. For instance, they may be wary of
early signs of financial hardship and payment difficulty, taking prompt action to reverse the
situation through proper interventions [110]. For a middle-aged or older adult, the ability
to adopt preventive strategies to manage mortgage loans attested this observation, thinking
and planning. Therefore, retirement preparedness was assumed to prevent lapsed payments
by lowering possibility of delinquency or default.
Hypothesis 1. It was hypothesized that retirement preparedness reduced the possibility
of holding a mortgage loan in retirement.
Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that retirement preparedness was related to smaller
remaining balance on a mortgage loan in retirement.
2.4 Method
2.4.1 Data
This research used panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Starting
from 1992, HRS surveyed a representative sample of American adults age 50 and older
every other year, collecting information on middle-aged and older Americans’ financial
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standing, retirement planning and wealth. Since the variable of retirement preparedness
first became available in Wave 2004, six waves from 2004 to 2014 were used to merge into
panel data.
2.4.2 Sample
Table 2.1 showed an overview of the panel sample, along with two subsamples of “Non-
retired” and “Retired.” The panel sample contained 113,547 responses from 27,636 unique
respondents. Each respondent participated in an average of 4.1 waves. The mean age of the
panel sample was 73.3 years old, with 41.9% being Male and 76.5% being White. Married
respondents accounted for 59.6%. Respondents had an average of 12.5 years of education.
More than one third (36.7%) had a paid job. Regarding retirement preparedness, the main
predictor of this study, about 37.9% of the respondents fell in the group of “Hardly at all.”
Participants answering “A little” and “Some” were 14.5% and 23.5%, respectively. The
rest 24.1% rated “A lot” on their retirement preparedness. Each respondent had an annual
household income of $75,984, possessing non-housing net worth of an average of $116,838.
About 76.6% of respondents owned a home. About 37.2% of homeowners had a mortgage
loan. During the six-wave period, about 38.9% of mortgagors had a mortgage payoff. Mean
home present value and mean mortgage outstanding balance were $229,684 and $127,501,
respectively, yielding a mean LTV ratio of 0.41.
“Non-retired” and “retired” subgroups had sample sizes of 47,263 and 54,172, respec-
tively. The “non-retired” were 66.1 years old and the “retired” were 78.3. Regarding retire-
ment preparedness, percentage of “Hardly at all” for “non-retired” and “retired” groups
were 34.6% and 40.8%, respectively, while “prepared a lot” accounted for 24.9% and
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Panel Sample
All respondents Non-retired Retired
Variables (Mean) (N = 113,547) (n =47,263) (n=54,172)
Number of unique respondents 27,636 12,594 15,042
Average waves participated 4.1 3.6 4.5
Demographics
Age (Years, SD) 73.3 11.4 66.1 8.5 78.3 9.8
Sex (%)
Male 41.9 44.8 40.0
Female 58.1 55.2 60.0
Race (%)
White 76.5 71.9 79.5
Black 16.9 19.1 15.3
Others 6.6 9.0 5.2
Marital status (%)
Married 59.6 64.8 56.0
Divorced/separated 15.1 19.5 1.9
Widowed 20.6 9.5 28.4
Others 4.7 6.2 3.7
Education (years) 12.5 13.1 12.3
Work for pay (%) 36.7 80.9 2.5
Retirement Preparedness (%)
Hardly at all 37.9 34.6 40.8
A little 14.5 16.2 12.9
Some 23.5 24.3 22.8
A lot 24.1 24.9 23.5
Financial status ($, SD)
Household income 75,984 100,741 104,621 116,971 43,120 67,181
Non-housing net worth 116,838 210,849 160,088 203,899 118,000 221,764
Housing and mortgage status
Homeownership (%) 76.6 76.7 70.5
Homeowners having mortgage loans (%) 37.2 48.4 24.2
Paid off mortgage loans (%) 38.9 34.7 46.9
Home present value ($, SD) 229,684 149,656 236,000 154,588 206,000 142,612
Mortgage outstanding balance ($, SD) 127,501 78,678 136,981 80,267 107,240 73,140
Loan-to-value ratio among mortgagors 0.41 0.43 0.37
Note. Panel dataset included six biannual waves from 2004-2014. Age in the panel dataset
referred to the age in Year 2014. All dollar values were converted into 2014 dollars using
Consumer Price Index.
23.5%. Financially, “non-retired” respondents had a mean annual household income of
$104,621, and the “retired” averaged of $43,120. Non-housing net worth for the two groups
were $160,088 and $118,000, respectively. Homeownership of “non-retired” and “retired”
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were 76.7% and 70.5%, amongwhom, about 48.4% and 24.2%had amortgage. Percentages
of payoff observed were 34.7% and 46.9%. The “non-retired” had a mean home present
value of $236,000 and a mean mortgage outstanding balance of $136,981, leading to a LTV
ratio of 0.43. The “retired” had a mean home present value of $206,000 and an average
mortgage outstanding balance of $107,240, resulting in a LTV ratio of 0.37.
2.4.3 Measures
Dependent variable of mortgage status. Two types of dependent variables were used
to indicate mortgage status: a binary variable for whether an individual had mortgage debt2;
and, if yes, a continuous variable of its LTV ratio. In particular, the question, “Do you have
a mortgage, land contract, or any other loan that uses the property as collateral?” was asked
to elucidate if the respondent had a mortgage when surveyed. The answer, “Yes, mortgage,”
indicated presence of a mortgage loan, coded “1”; otherwise “0.” A switch from “yes” to
“no” between waves indicated mortgage payoff.
To obtain the LTV ratio, first, mortgage outstanding balance was measured by asking
“About how much do you still owe on the mortgage?” Self-reported balance was recorded.
And then current home value was found by asking “What is its present value? I mean,
what would it bring if it were sold today?” Respondents’ self-reported home values were
recorded. Last, the LTV ratio was calculated by dividing mortgage balance by home value.
Independent variable of retirement preparedness. The measure of retirement pre-
paredness was group-specific depending on retirement status. To clarify an individual’s
retirement status, the question “Do you consider yourself completely retired, partly retired,
2This study included only the mortgage of the primary residency.
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or not retired at all?” was asked. Answers of “Completely retired,” “Partly retired” and
“Not retired at all” were dichotomized into “Retired” (i.e., originally “retired”), coded “1”;
and “Non-retired” (i.e., originally “partly retired” or “not retired at all”), coded “0.”
For retired participants, the question, “Before you retired, howmuch did you think about
retirement: a lot, some, a little, or hardly at all?” was asked. The non-retired counterparts
were asked, “How much have you thought about retirement: a lot, some, a little, or hardly
at all?” Both questions were measured on a four-point Likert scale including “A lot” (1),
“Some” (2), “A little” (3) and “Hardly at all” (4).
Relevant independent variables. Demographic variables of age, sex, race, marital
status, education, income and net worth were included.
2.4.4 Analysis
Retirement preparedness as the main predictor was described among panel sample and
subsamples of the non-retired and retired. Chi-squared test and F-test were performed to
show the relationship between preparedness and (1) if having mortgage debt and (2) LTV
ratio, respectively.
Fixed-effects logistic regression examined and quantified the impact of preparedness
on whether a mortgage loan was paid off when retired. The same procedures were repeated
on non-retired and retired subsamples. Next, for cases in which mortgage loans were not
yet paid off, in order to examine whether preparedness influenced the remaining balance,
fixed-effects multiple regressions were conducted on panel sample and non-retired and re-
tired subgroups alike. To attest the robustness of the above fixed-effects models, sensitivity
tests were performed. In particular, among six waves, each participant’s first response to
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“preparedness” and last response to mortgage status were extracted to compile into a new
sample. In addition, time (in years) between first observation of “preparedness” and last
observation of mortgage loan status was calculated. Its purpose was to detect if duration
(between preparing and latest mortgage condition) had statistical impact on mortgage sta-
tus. Multiple regression was then conducted to examine whether preparedness reduced the
possibility of holding a mortgage (or smaller balance). The same procedures were repeated
on non-retired and retired subgroups.
Since fixed-effects models adopted a differential method, aiming to detect if change in
the dependent variable was a result of change in an independent variable, only respondents
participating in at least two waves and two waves that had different values were retained. In
other words, responses from two waves produced one differential, which was then usable to
fixed-effects estimation. In addition, the differentiating process eliminated time-invariant
variables (e.g., race or sex), focusing on time-variant predictors (e.g., preparedness). Given
the core idea of fixed-effects methods, respondents who participated in only one wave were
eliminated in fixed-effects regressions.
2.5 Result
Table 2.2 described the main predictor, “retirement preparedness.” In particular, across
two subgroups of “Non-retired” and “Retired,” first, the distribution of four categories in
“preparedness” was described: “Hardly at all,” “A little,” “Some” and “A lot.” Then, its
association with whether or not having mortgage loans was shown. In the panel sample,
therewere 76,856 homeowners, and 30,179 reported havingmortgage loans. Among 19,358
non-retired mortgagors, about 29.8% fell in the category of “Hardly at all” in retirement
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preparedness. Percentage for “A little” and “Some” were 16.2% and 27.3%, and about
26.7% thought they had prepared “A lot” (χ2 (3) = 194.78, p < .001). Moving to retired
mortgagors (n = 10,090), about 38.3%, a much higher percentage than their non-retired
counterparts, selected “Hardly at all” for their retirement preparedness. Percentage for “A
little,” “Some” and “A lot” categories were 12.4%, 23.4%, and 25.9% (χ2 (3) = 21.16,
p < .001).
Table 2.2: Panel Sample: Had Mortgage Loans by Preparedness among Homeowners
Non-retired Retired
(n = 19,358) (n = 10,090)
Preparedness % χ2(3) p % χ2(3) p
Hardly at all 29.8 38.3
A little 16.2 12.4
Some 27.3 23.4
A lot 26.7 194.78 <.001 25.9 21.16 <.001
Note. In the Panel sample, there were 76,856 homeowners, and 30,179 reported having
mortgage loans.
Table 2.3 described the dependent variable of mortgage outstanding balance, along with
statistics of home present value and LTV ratio. All homeowners included (Table 2.3a), home
present value was $229,684, and the outstanding balance on mortgage was $127,501. Com-
parison between mortgage-free homeowners and those having mortgages showed that the
mortgage-free group had a mean home present value of $211,768, while their mortgagor
counterparts had a higher home present value of $256,336, with the mean outstanding bal-
ance being $127,501.
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Table 2.3: Home Present Value, Mortgage Outstanding Balance and Loan-to-Value Ratio
(a) Panel Sample: Mean Home Present Value and Mortgage Outstanding Balance
All homeowners Mortgage-free Had mortgage
HPV Balance HPV Balance HPV Balance
(n =
44,891)
(n =
16,143)
(n =
26,845)
n/a (n =
18,046)
(n =
17,756)
229,684 127,501 211,768 n/a 256,336 127,501
(b) Panel Mortgagors: Mean Home Present Value and Mortgage Outstanding Balance by Prepared-
ness
Non-retired Retired
HPV Balance HPV Balance
Preparedness (n = 30,318) (n = 16,143) (n = 30,994) (n = 7,794)
Hardly at all 235,066 128,249 218,794 106,355
A little 245,109 123,862 219,324 106,078
Some 258,161 125,414 219,616 109,526
A lot 252,667 125,793 219,564 110,533
(c) Panel Mortgagors: Mean Loan-to-Value Ratio by Preparedness
Non-retired Retired
(n = 16,080) (n = 7,767)
Preparedness M SD F
(3,16076)
p M SD F
(3,7763)
p
Hardly at all 0.47 0.29 0.41 0.25
A little 0.44 0.27 0.35 0.24
Some 0.41 0.26 0.36 0.22
A lot 0.41 0.23 46.40 <.001 0.36 0.21 26.68 <.001
Note. HPV = Home present value. Home present value and mortgage loan outstanding
balance were self-reported. All dollar values were converted into 2014 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index.
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Next, the dependent variable of mortgage outstanding balance was described with its
relationship to the main predictor of retirement preparedness, and this description was
retirement-status-specific as well (Table 2.3b). For the “Non-Retired” mortgagors who
prepared “Hardly at all,” mortgage loans amounted to an average of $128,429 out of the
mean home present value of $235,066. Although home present value for categories of “A
little,” “Some,” and “A lot” were in comparison higher than individuals in the “Hardly at
all” group, the mean outstanding balance in these three categories were relatively lower,
being $123,862, $125,414 and $125,793. Moving to the subsample of retired mortgagors,
overall, respondents had lower home present values and smaller outstanding balances than
their non-retired counterparts across all preparedness levels. For example, those who pre-
pared “Hardly at all” had a mean home present value of $218,794 and owed an average of
$106,355 on themortgage. While home present values on each level of retirement prepared-
ness were not drastically different, mortgage balances were higher for those who prepared
“Some” and “A lot,” being $109,526 and $110,533, respectively.
Lastly, LTV ratios across four preparedness categories were described and compared
(Table 2.3c). Among non-retired mortgagors, the mean LTV ratio decreased with more
preparedness. In particular, from “Hardly at all” to “A lot,” the mean ratio dropped from
0.47 to 0.41 (F (3, 16067) = 46.40, p < .001). A similar pattern was found in the “Re-
tired” group: that is, mean LTV ratio got smaller when mortgagors were more “prepared.”
The ratio was 0.41 for those who prepared “Hardly at all,” while the ratio was 0.36 when
mortgagors prepared “A lot” (F (3, 7763) = 26.68, p < .001).
Table 2.4 displayed results of fixed-effects logistic regression predictingwhether a home-
owner had a mortgage loan. All homeowners in the panel sample included, individuals
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showing change in loan status, that is, switching from reporting having a mortgage loan to
reporting not having the loan anymore, were included in the model, yielding a total response
of n = 11,848 in the logistic fixed-effects model. Model 1 regressed the main predictor, re-
tirement preparedness, on the binary variable of “Having mortgage loan,” indicating that,
compared with “Hardly at all,” those who prepared “Some” were 13.9% more likely to
carry mortgage loans (p = .048). Using the same sample, Model 2 added demographic
variables, showing that “Some” preparedness still had an impact, which was 17.4% higher
likelihood of carrying a mortgage loan (p = .021). Age was negatively related to whether
a homeowner had a mortgage loan. In particular, compared with respondents age 50-64,
mortgagors ages 65-74 were 46.2% less likely to have a mortgage loan (p < .001), and
those age 75+ were 89.6% more likely to complete mortgage payment (p < .001). Home-
owners who had paid jobs were 27.1% more likely to carry a loan than the non-working
counterparts (p = .001). Higher household income predicted a 9.4% higher likelihood of
having a mortgage loan (p = .018), whereas higher non-housing net worth predicted a
5.1% lower likelihood of having a loan (p = .002). Dummy wave variable indicated that,
after Year 2008, homeowners were nearly three times less likely (odds ratio = 2.8) to carry
a mortgage loan (p < .001).
Examination of the effect of preparedness on whether a homeowner had amortgage loan
was also conducted on two subsamples of “Non-retired” and “Retired” using fixed-effects
logistic regression. As seen in Table 2.5, Panel 1, Model 1 merely contained the main pre-
dictor of retirement preparedness, indicating that pre-retirees with “A lot” of preparedness
were 40.5% less likely to have mortgage loans (p = .001). Model 2 added demographic
and financial status variables, showing that preparing “A lot” still had an impact (i.e., 25%
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Table 2.4: Panel Sample: Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Whether a Home-
owner Had a Mortgage Loan (N =11,848)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little 0.11 0.07 .110 0.15 0.08 .053
Some 0.13 0.07 .048 0.16 0.07 .021
A lot 0.06 0.07 .419 0.04 0.08 .557
Age
65-74 -0.38 0.08 <.001
75+ -0.64 0.15 <.001
Marital status
Divorced/separated 0.12 0.18 .516
Widowed -0.30 0.17 .076
Others -0.07 0.51 .149
Years of education -0.07 0.04 .055
Work for pay 0.24 0.07 .001
Household income (log) 0.09 0.04 .018
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.05 0.02 .002
After year 2008 -1.00 0.05 <.001
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.098
Note. Reference groups were “Hardly at all,” “Age 50-64,” “Married” and did not have a
paid job.
less likely) to carry mortgage loan (p = .041). Age was inversely related to the status
of having mortgage loan. That is, compared with counterparts younger than 65 years old,
those between 65-74 were 53.7% less likely to have a loan (p < .001), and individuals
age 75+ were 3.4 times less likely to have mortgages (p < .001). Widowhood reduced
the likelihood of holding a mortgage by 66.5% (p = .036). The likelihood of having a
mortgage was decreased by about 11% with more education (p < .010) and by 7.2% with
larger non-housing net worth (p = .004). After Year 2008, homeowners were 2.8 times
less likely to have a mortgage loan (p < .001).
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Table 2.5: Panel Subsamples: Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Whether a
Homeowner Had a Mortgage Loan
Panel 1: Non-retired (n =5,920)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.01 0.10 .921 0.05 0.10 .627
Some 0.01 0.10 .972 0.06 0.10 .530
A lot -0.34 0.10 .001 -0.22 0.10 .041
Age
65-74 -0.43 0.12 <.001
75+ -1.23 0.32 <.001
Marital status
Divorced/separated 0.39 0.23 .156
Widowed -0.51 0.30 .036
Others -0.69 0.59 .230
Years of education -0.10 0.04 .010
Work for pay 0.03 0.13 .839
Household income (log) 0.05 0.05 .291
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.07 0.02 .004
After year 2008 -1.02 0.07 <.001
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.092
Panel 2: Retired (n =3,765)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little 0.23 0.13 .076 0.30 0.13 .028
Some 0.16 0.12 .155 0.23 0.12 .061
A lot 0.18 0.13 .169 0.17 0.14 .216
Age
65-74 -0.30 0.14 .034
75+ -0.62 0.23 .006
Marital status
Divorced/separated -0.07 0.36 .889
Widowed -0.30 0.23 .196
Others -0.64 1.13 .570
Years of education 0.30 0.15 .040
Work for pay -0.08 0.25 .752
Household income (log) 0.11 0.07 .110
Non-housing net worth (log) 0.02 0.03 .600
After year 2008 -0.80 0.09 <.001
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.072
Note. Reference groups were “Hardly at all,” “Age 50-64” and “Married.”
36
Table 2.5 Panel 2 showed the impact of retirement preparedness on mortgage loan sta-
tus among the retired sample. All predictors included (as seen in Model 2), a retiree who
prepared “A little” before retirement was 35.0% more likely to take mortgage loans into
retirement (p = .028). Age still had a statistical impact. Compared with the reference age
group of 50-64, ages 65-74 and 75+ reduced the likelihood of having a mortgage loan by
35.0% (p = .034) and by 85.9% (p = .006), respectively. Similarly, respondents were
2.2 times less likely to have a mortgage loan in Year 2008 and aftermath (p < .001).
Results predicting loan burden, presented as continuous dependent variable of LTV ra-
tio, were shown in Table 2.6. Model 1 contained retirement preparedness, and Model 2
factored in all relevant independent variables. Model 1 indicated that higher preparedness
level was statistically related to a smaller LTV ratio. That is, “Some” and “A lot” of pre-
paredness decreased the ratio by 0.01 (p < .001). All independent variables included
(as seen in Model 2), higher preparedness still had a reverse statistical impact on the ratio.
Namely, “Some” and “A lot” of preparedness both reduced the ratio by 0.01 (p = .001).
Older age was associated with smaller ratios. Specifically, the ratio decreased by 0.02 and
0.04 by age groups 50-64 (p < .001) and 65+ (p < .001), respectively. Widowhood
statistically reduced the ratio by 0.05 (p < .001). Similarly, in the aftermath of Year 2008,
LTV ratio dropped by 0.04 (p < .001).
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Table 2.6: Panel Sample: Fixed-Effects Regression Predicting Loan-to-Value Ratio (N
=19,145)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.01 0.01 .400 -0.01 0.01 .338
Some -0.01 0.01 <.001 -0.01 0.01 .001
A lot -0.01 0.01 <.001 -0.01 0.01 .001
Age
50-64 -0.02 0.01 <.001
65+ -0.04 0.01 <.001
Marital status
Divorced/separated -0.01 0.01 .543
Widowed -0.05 0.01 <.001
Others -0.02 0.03 .567
Years of education 0.01 0.01 .492
Work for pay -0.01 0.01 .386
Household income (log) -0.01 0.01 .730
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.01 0.01 .862
After year 2008 -0.04 0.01 <.001
Constant 0.41 0.01 <.001 0.44 0.03 <.001
R2 (Within) 0.002 0.036
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In line with Table 2.6, Table 2.7 showed results from fixed-effects multiple regressions
on two subsamples of the “Non-retired” (see Panel 1) and “Retired” (see Panel 2). As shown
in Panel 1, the pre-retired group retained 13,165 responses, and that for the retiree group
was n = 5,980. For both subsamples, Model 1 had only the main predictor of retirement
preparedness, while Model 2 added all relevant independent variables. For the pre-retired
group, preparedness had an adverse statistical impact on LTV ratio. In Model 1, “Some”
and “A lot” of preparedness decreased the ratio by 0.02 (p < .001) and 0.03 (p < .001),
respectively. Model 2 revealed that “Some” and “A lot” of preparedness reduced the ratio
by 0.02 (p < .001) and 0.02 (p < .001) alike. In addition, ratios got smaller by 0.03 with
higher age for both age groups of 50-64 (p < .001) and 0.03 (p = .027). Widowhood
decreased the ratio by 0.03 (p < .001). Wave dummy variable indicated that ratio was
reduced by 0.04 in post-2008 years.
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Table 2.7: Panel Subsamples: Fixed-Effects Regression Predicting Loan-to-Value Ratio
Panel 1: Non-retired (n =13,165)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.01 0.01 .037 -0.01 0.01 .034
Some -0.02 0.01 <.001 -0.02 0.01 <.001
A lot -0.03 0.01 <.001 -0.02 0.01 <.001
Age
50-64 -0.03 0.01 <.001
65+ -0.03 0.02 .027
Marital status
Divorced/separated -0.01 0.01 .758
Widowed -0.05 0.01 <.001
Others -0.03 0.03 .331
Years of education 0.01 0.01 .607
Work for pay -0.01 0.01 .141
Household income (log) 0.01 0.01 .917
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.01 0.01 .630
After year 2008 -0.04 0.01 <.001
Constant 0.44 0.01 <.001 0.46 0.04 <.001
R2 (Within) 0.004 0.035
Panel 2: Retired (n =5,980)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef se p Coef se p
Preparedness
A little 0.01 0.01 .177 0.01 0.01 .134
Some -0.01 0.01 .467 -0.01 0.01 .711
A lot 0.01 0.01 .945 -0.01 0.01 .736
Age
50-64 -0.02 0.01 .006
65+ -0.04 0.01 .001
Marital status
Divorced/separated -0.03 0.06 .107
Widowed -0.05 0.04 <.001
Others 0.10 0.21 .077
Years of education 0.01 0.01 .639
Work for pay 0.01 0.01 .261
Household income (log) -0.01 0.01 .369
Non-housing net worth (log) 0.01 0.01 .334
After year 2008 -0.03 0.01 <.001
Constant 0.37 0.01 <.001 0.39 0.09 <.001
R2 (Within) 0.002 0.045
40
In Panel 2, results indicated that preparedness had no statistical impact on the ratio
among retired mortgagors. The ratio decreased, however, with higher age. Age groups
50-64 and 65+ reduced the ratio by 0.02 (p = .006) and 0.04 (p = .001), respectively.
Similarly, the ratio also decreased by 0.05 with widowhood (p < .001). In the aftermath
of Year 2008, LTV ratio dropped by 0.03 (p < .001).
In order to test the robustness of the fixed-effects models, sensitivity tests were con-
ducted (see Table 2.8. Specifically, sensitivity test models consisted of the same sample
of homeowners having mortgage loans. The predictor was the first observation of a mort-
gagor’s preparedness, with the dependent variable (i.e., LTV ratio) being the latest obser-
vation during all waves participated. Multiple regression revealed that more preparedness
statistically reduced LTV ratio. The ratio decreased by “A little,” “Some” and “A lot” by
0.07 (p < .001), 0.08 (p < .001) and 0.13 (p < .001). Similar to the fixed-effects
model’s prediction, older age was related to smaller ratio (i.e., reduced by 0.01, p < .001).
Racial minorities had larger LTV ratios; ratios increased by 0.09 (p < .001) and by 0.06
(p = .013) when being Black and Others, respectively. Divorce statistically related to
larger ratio (i.e., increased by 0.03, p = .026). Financially, higher non-housing net worth
reduced the ratio by 0.01 (p < .001). Lastly, regressions on subsamples of the non-retired
and the retired yielded consistent results, showing that higher preparedness and older age
statistically related to smaller LTV ratio by latest observation (see Table 2.9).
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity Test Using Pooled Sample: Retirement Preparedness and Loan-to-
Value Ratio (N =6,324)
Variable Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.07 0.02 <.001
Some -0.08 0.01 <.001
A lot -0.13 0.01 <.001
Age -0.01 0.01 <.001
Male 0.02 0.01 .065
Race
Black 0.09 0.02 <.001
Others 0.06 0.02 .013
Marital status
Divorced/separated 0.03 0.02 .026
Widowed 0.01 0.02 .788
Others 0.04 0.03 .148
Years of education -0.01 0.01 .327
Work for pay -0.02 0.01 .174
Household income (log) 0.01 0.01 .544
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.01 0.01 <.001
Constant 0.91 0.10 <.001
R2 0.047
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Table 2.9: Sensitivity Test Using Pooled Subsamples: Retirement Preparedness and Loan-
to-Value Ratio
Panel 1: Non-retired (n =4,847)
Variable Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.06 0.02 .002
Some -0.09 0.02 <.001
A lot -0.14 0.02 <.001
Age -0.01 0.01 <.001
Male 0.02 0.01 .156
Race
Black 0.10 0.02 <.001
Others 0.06 0.02 .023
Marital status
Divorced/separated 0.02 0.02 .182
Widowed -0.01 0.03 .847
Others 0.04 0.03 .146
Years of education -0.01 0.01 .611
Work for pay -0.05 0.02 .014
Household income (log) 0.01 0.01 .626
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.01 0.01 <.001
Constant 0.90 0.12 <.001
R2 0.044
Panel 2: Retired (n =1,477)
Variable Coef se p
Preparedness
A little -0.11 0.03 .001
Some -0.07 0.03 .008
A lot -0.12 0.02 <.001
Age -0.01 0.01 .001
Male 0.05 0.02 .029
Race
Black 0.07 0.03 .030
Others 0.05 0.05 .378
Marital status
Divorced/separated 0.08 0.03 .016
Widowed 0.04 0.03 .367
Others 0.03 0.06 .743
Years of education -0.01 0.01 .222
Work for pay -0.06 0.05 .226
Household income (log) 0.01 0.01 .927
Non-housing net worth (log) -0.01 0.01 .001
Constant 0.80 0.18 <.001
R2 0.054
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2.6 Discussion
Targeting American adults over age 50, this study uses six waves from the HRS data
(2004-2014) to examine and quantify the impact of retirement preparedness on mortgage
status in transition to retirement, shown in forms of (1) whether a mortgagor is able to
complete payment and (2) in case of no payoff, the LTV ratio. Overall, our findings show
that, transitioning to retirement, preparedness promotes mortgage payoff and, in situations
of not yet paid off, smaller LTV ratio, that is, less remaining mortgage balance.
Specifically, the first hypothesis assumes that preparedness reduces the likelihood of
having mortgage debt. Results nicely align with this hypothesis—but only on the non-
retired sample—showing that a middle-aged or older mortgagor with some levels of retire-
ment preparation is more likely to experience mortgage payoff than non-prepared counter-
parts (i.e., 25% higher likelihood), even after accounting for impacts from demographic
and financial variables. This is a novel finding in the field of consumers’ mortgage debt,
suggesting first the importance of preparation in order to reduce mortgage burden when
retirement approaches, and second, the timing to initiate planning, that is, to prepare in ad-
vance. Nevertheless, for retirees who have switched from living on earned income to Social
Security benefits and pensions, it may be already late to enact mortgage strategies. Prepa-
ration therefore would be of little help when it comes to alleviating mortgage burdens. That
may explain why the impact on the retired sample is too weak to be discerned. Confirming
earlier findings by Lusardi and Mitchell [77] that retirement preparedness promoted wealth
growth, our result is clear evidence that reducing debt, especially mortgage loan debt, may
be as essential as savings and investment to wealth accumulation and financial well-being.
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In all, preparedness, if done ahead of retirement, leads to mortgage payoff, thus making a
smoother transition to retirement.
Our findings furthermore show that older mortgagors are less likely to have mortgage
debt than younger counterparts. Caveats here suggest that time itself will solve themortgage
issue while neglecting the impact of preparedness. Of course, as time goes by, an individual
naturally approaches the maturation of a mortgage loan (i.e., mortgage payoff). Yet the
concern pertains to increasing financial vulnerability as people age. As mentioned earlier,
senior mortgagors tend to have higher delinquency and default rates [45]. Accounting for
older people’s medical expenses and moderate income, mortgage would inflict excessive
burden. So, age or time per semay not overshadow the importance of retirement preparation
when it comes to seniors’ mortgage loans. Furthermore, widowed individuals are found
less likely to hold a mortgage. Informed by previous research that the widowed had lower
homeownership than married people [6], it is possible that the widowed may choose to sell
their homes after the decease of their spouse. Having done so, their mortgage debt is paid
off through home sale.
Next, we also find that larger (non-housing) net worth leads to mortgage payoff, sug-
gesting that a near-retiree can allocate savings and investments or other types of net worth to
pay off a mortgage debt. It is worth noting that, without perseverance on asset accumulation
and constant planning over a long period of time, a person may rarely attain large net worth.
This again stresses the importance of retirement preparedness and planning in advance. Un-
surprisingly, discontinuity of holding mortgage debt becomes prevalent after 2008. This is
likely to be owing to loss of homes from home sale or foreclosure following the bursting
of the housing bubble in 2008. Lastly, higher education reduces a near-retiree’s likelihood
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of having mortgage debt. A possible explanation is that people with better education tend
to have higher financial literacy. Since financial literacy contributes to effective mortgage
managing, for example, avoidance of high-cost borrowing or keen perception of the hous-
ing market [109], it is reasonable that higher education level is a predictor of mortgage
payoff. Apart from the above factors influencing completion of mortgage loans, our paper
also yields some interesting findings. For example, retirees who prepared “A little” tend
to hold mortgages into retirement. This may be a purposeful financial decision relating to
tax benefits. That is to say, for some retired people, reducing taxable income via deductible
mortgage interest may be an incentive to continue holding mortgages3. Although statistics
of retirees’ use of mortgage interest deduction is somewhat scant, the report shows that, all
ages considered, mortgage interest deduction remains the largest dollar amount claimed cat-
egory (followed by medical expenses among U.S. tax filers) [54]. Therefore, tax incentives
may be a sensible explanation of this finding.
The second hypothesis assumes that, if a mortgage loan is not yet paid off, higher re-
tirement preparedness relates to a smaller LTV ratio, meaning that should home price be
the same, those who once prepared tend to owe less. This hypothesis is supported by our
results—still, only on the non-retired sample, suggesting that one-level increase in pre-
paredness4 reduces the LTV ratio by 0.02, equaling 2% of home price. Straightforwardly
speaking, a non-retired mortgagor’s balance would be reduced by $4,000 on a $200,000
house with more preparation—and only when it is done before retirement. Factors con-
tributing to smaller LTV ratios are found to be consistent with the first hypothesis (i.e., if
3The home mortgage interest deduction only applies to the first $1 million of mortgage debt [73].
4Preparedness is measured on a four-point Likert scale of “Hardly at all” “A little” “Some” and “A lot”.
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an individual has paid off a mortgage). For example, older age, being widowed and af-
ter the Great Recession of 2008. Preparedness one more time plays no role on the retired
subsample, which may be seen as a red flag of late initiation of preparation.
In short, when it comes to managing mortgage loans, planning ahead of retirement is
the key. A pre-retiree is suggested to give sufficient time for preparation to take effect; once
retired, it may be too late for strategies to become effective. This finding is in accordance
with results from sensitivity tests, which aim to examine the robustness of the above results.
In particular, people who have smaller LTV ratio tend to prepare farther ahead of retirement
(i.e., longer duration between preparedness and payoff), stressing the impact of “think early”
on a less stressful mortgage situation in later years.
Despite these findings, the following issues, if improved in future research, will help
researchers to better understand retirement planning and consumers’ mortgage debt. First,
self-reported home present value and mortgage balance may not be accurate enough to yield
a precise LTV ratio, possibly bringing in some “noise” when quantifying the impact of
retirement preparedness on LTV ratio. Second, voluntary and involuntary mortgage payoff
may be distinguished, as “voluntary” implies successful completion while “involuntary”
may result from foreclosure or unanticipated loss of home.
2.7 Implication
This paper highlights the impacts of preparedness as a crucial component in retirement
planning on mortgage debt manageability and the importance of preparing early. Using
Wave 2010 as an example, we further detect that, among near-retirees ages 55-60 who
initially reported “Hardly at all” in preparedness, about 47.6% showed no increase in pre-
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paredness level in any of the following waves participated (seeAppendixA). In other words,
approaching retirement, nearly half of people who did not know they should prepare for it
still have little knowledge about it today. This attests to the imperative needs to increase
awareness and recognition on retirement readiness.
In line with this target, pedagogy is vital. First, financial education—especially mort-
gage managing strategies—ought to reach more mortgagors and as early as possible. For
the first objective, seminars at the workplace present an opportunity. Specifically, educa-
tors may consider adding topics relating to mortgages in curriculum, which traditionally
only cover savings such as 401(k) or Health Savings Accounts. Considering that mortgage
debt is somehow a complex area, educators may turn to the CFPB website for help, where
learning materials such as how to understand your statement and what to do when having
payment difficulty are listed in detail5. With increased awareness and knowledge, many
people are likely to begin to think about their retirement life and evaluate their mortgage
status, tasks they otherwise would not be aware of.
Secondly, please note that planning cannot be extricated from an individual’s time pref-
erence [26]. In reality, there are people who choose to “live in the present,” despite knowing
the concept of retirement preparation. Therefore, maneuvering to reduce their LTV ratio
may be a workable strategy. To implement, educators may recommend that mortgagors
save for higher monthly payments so as to speed up payment progress. To do this, a simple
and valid question identifying people with time preference for the present is needed.
In addition to raising attention on preparedness, the second goal is to start early. This
suggests that the “notice” of handling mortgage as part of retirement preparation should
5https://www.consumerfinance.gov/consumer-tools/mortgages/
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be given as early as possible, since time is essential for financial planning to take effect
given the changing macro-economic situation and the housing market in general. Employ-
ers may consider making it mandatory to attend retirement seminars and recruiting younger
employees, for example, individuals in their early 30s. Someone in his or her 30s may seem
young for a retirement seminar; however, considering delayed first-time home buying and
the popularity of 30-year loans, having mortgage debt in one’s 60s would be very possible
for current middle-aged cohorts.
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
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CHAPTER 3. HEALTH SHOCKSAND MORTGAGE DEBT PAYOFF: AN
APPROACH OF SURVIVALANALYSIS
3.1 Abstract
Mortgage debt inflicted financial strains on middle-aged and older Americans. Mean-
while, as health declined, they also anticipated more medical expenses. Under limited re-
sources, demands of mortgage payments and healthcare costs competed. One concern was
whether mortgage payoff was deterred by health condition and, if delayed, then for how
long. Targeting American adults age 50 and older, two questions were examined using sur-
vival analysis: how did health affect likelihood of mortgage payoff, and what was the esti-
mated payoff time by health shock? Six biannual waves (2004-2014) of panel data from the
Health and Retirement Study were used. Results showed that both chronic health conditions
(5-8 types) and health shock reduced the likelihood of payoff by 22%. Furthermore, health
impact on retirement preparedness became worse with age: At age 60, estimated time to
payoff for a mortgagor with health shock was two months longer than without health shock
(9.3 vs. 9.1 years). The disparity at age 75 widened to 10 months, from 7.6 (no shock) to 8.4
(had shock) years. Implications for alleviating older adults’ financial strains of mortgage
and health expenses are addressed.
Keywords: mortgage loan, health shock, chronic health condition, survival analysis,
middle-aged and older Americans
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3.2 Introduction
Over the last ten years, mortgage remainedAmericans’ biggest household debt. Nearly
40%ofmiddle-aged and older homeowners retiredwithmortgage balances averaging $75,000
[69]. Theoretically, debts were paid off by retirement. Savings accumulated in working
years were then released to maintain a similar standard of living for smooth consumption.
Practically, having mortgage at older ages gave rise to financial concerns, one of the many
being hardship on payments and lower quality of life in general [89].
Meanwhile, health declined with aging. Older adults tended to have more chronic con-
ditions and were susceptible to health shock. Among adults age 65 and beyond, about three
out of four had two or more chronic illnesses. Individuals over 65 paid an average annual
out-of-pocket (OOP) health expense of $1,215, and the expense may vastly increase with
new health events [23]. Debilitating health had financial consequences. Studies revealed
health shock as a predictor of financial fragility [75], associating with liquidity constraint
and higher unsecured debts [64, 122].
Wealth of today’s middle-aged and older Americans was largely insufficient for life in
later years. Upon retirement, source of income switched from earned income to Social Se-
curity benefits and pensions, likely not fully covering living expenses [108]. Furthermore,
wealth loss from the Great Recession resulted in higher debts relative to assets (Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau1, 2014 [28]). Therefore, under limited resources, fulfilling
mortgage and medical financial obligations could be a hurdle to financial security, impos-
ing perpetual budget constraint and resulting in exploitation of net worth. To reconcile
1Abbreviated as CFPB
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needs from mortgage debt and medical expenses, an important step was to understand the
interrelation between the two: in this paper, health impact on mortgage loan payoff.
This study contributed to the literature by bridging health shock including chronic con-
ditions and the biggest share of household debt: mortgage loans. Its primary purpose was to
explore whether health had any impact onmortgage payoff. Two specific research questions
were asked. Among American mortgagors age 50 and older, what impact did health shock
have on likelihood of mortgage payoff, and what was the estimated payoff time under dif-
ferent health conditions? Using panel data from six waves (2004-2014) of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), survival analysis incorporating both observed mortgage payoff
and unobserved payoff (i.e., censored data) provided estimates for both research questions.
3.3 Literature Review
3.3.1 Determinants of Using a Mortgage
Economic perspective. The classical economic model of the life-cycle hypothesis
(LCH) suggested that, assuming a rational consumer with perfect knowledge about the fu-
ture, debt demand was determined by age [85]. Across lifespan, keeping constant marginal
utility was essential to smoothing consumption and lifetime utility maximization. That said,
at younger ages, when income earned was lower than its proper share of lifetime wealth,
buying a home was unaffordable, and borrowing against future income was therefore nec-
essary. As noted by Jones [56], accruing equity through mortgage payments was a theoret-
ically optimum financial decision to maximize satisfaction. In working years, wealth grew,
part of it allocated for paying debts. By retirement, debts were paid off, and wealth peaked;
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net worth was then carried over to retirement to maintain the same standard of living. There-
fore, in contrast to their younger counterparts’ higher mortgage demand, middle-aged and
older people had a propensity to reduce their mortgage debts.
Empirically, previous studies revealed mortgage affordability as a main economic pre-
dictor of the borrowing decision. People preferred mortgages that were affordable given
their financial situation so as to live within their means. Affordability was in part determined
by cost of mortgage relative to income. So younger individuals or people earning lower
income chose mortgages with less total cost [98] or adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) of-
fering lower initial payments [32]. When a mortgage became unaffordable (likely resulting
from larger loan-to-value ratio or increased future payments) [40], a mortgage was modi-
fied, refinanced or consolidated, or terminated [11].
Behavioral perspective. Individuals’ risk preference played a role in the decision to
use a mortgage loan. Risk preference, known as the extent to which a person was willing
to take in an investment, affected the decision whether to prepay a mortgage (i.e., earlier
payoff). Mortgage as an investment generated returns from home value appreciation over
time, of course, with risks of value falling [15]. People whowere uncomfortable with taking
investment risks attempted to minimize loss by speeding up mortgage payments just to be
safe. So risk-averse borrowers used available resources for prepayment, eliminating future
risks of home value depreciation and high leveraging [34]. On the contrary, risk-tolerant
homeowners strategically held their mortgage and used capital (saved from prepayment)
to generate returns from other investments for asset diversification [84]. Apart from risk
preference, time preference also explained the willingness to use a mortgage. A preference
for the present impaired the decision to take a mortgage loan, because instant gratification
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through consumption for now was more tempting than accumulating home equity through
mortgage payments for future use [94].
Another predictor of using mortgages was the motive of precaution. As the second
largest retirement asset (following pensions and savings), home equity accumulated through
mortgage payments functioned as a buffer capital or financial cushion under precautionary
motive. This to some extent explained why longevity was suggested as a contributing factor
of keeping a mortgage loan among older adults [52]. Aside from precaution, bequest mo-
tive was also indirectly related to mortgage decisions: bequeathing was found to lower the
likelihood of releasing home equity using reverse mortgage or home equity line of credit
(HELOC) [33].
Last, tax policy provided compensation for mortgage payers through mortgage inter-
est payment deduction from taxable income, lowering the cost of using a mortgage. This
could be an incentive to keeping homeownership and thus mortgage debt. For example,
in itemized deduction, mortgage interest payment was the category with the highest dollar
value claimed. About 83.1% of homeowners age 50 and older used itemized deductions to
claim tax benefits, yielding an average tax savings of $2,000 [96]. In all, the decision to
use a mortgage was dependent on multiple factors in both the economic model on age and
affordability and behavioral aspects on personal preferences and motives, along with tax
policies at a macro level [18, 70].
3.3.2 Financial Burdens from Mortgage and Medical Expenses
Mortgage debt. Delayed first-time home buying implied that many Americans had
to take their mortgage debt into retirement [75]. Given resource inadequacy—a common
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financial situation among middle-aged and older people—mortgage debt could be a threat
to financial security in later years. First, mortgage debt deterred saving. About 45% of
near-retirees had no savings in their retirement accounts [99]. As retirement approached,
people generally had fewer working years left, anticipating less future income and making
it harder to reach the desirable savings amount before retirement. With mortgage debt,
tradeoffs between savings and mortgage payments had to be made. Since debt repayment
as a contracted financial obligation was often given higher priority, savings as a result could
be impeded [28].
Next, having mortgage debt lower older people’s quality of life. Once retired, Social
Security benefits and pensions substituting for earned income were insufficient to sustain
standard of living from working years [108]. With mortgage payments and reduced discre-
tionary income, budget constraints occurred. As shown byMunnel and colleagues using the
National Retirement Risk Index, households had tomake financial adjustments, for example
cutting back on living expenses, to fulfill debt obligation and support everyday living [89].
If high debt service-to-income ratio persisted [44], mortgage debts could become burden-
some, imposing higher risks of delinquency or default on mortgage loans [69]. Therefore,
with inadequate wealth, mortgage debt inflicted financial hardship through lowered stan-
dard of living.
Medical expenses. The proportion of older Americans with chronic disease was con-
siderably high. Nearly half (45.7%) of older adults had one chronic condition, and two out
of three had two or more [20]. Chronic illnesses as a leading cause of death required con-
tinuous medical attention for an extended period of time, accounting for over 90% of older
adults’ healthcare costs [23]. Although health insurance (from private or public sources)
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covered most health service on chronic conditions, patients were still responsible for co-
pays. Depending on the number and severity of health conditions, over 60% of older
adults’ OOP expenses were between $1,000 and $2,000, with costs being higher for the
uninsured2 [93].
Aside from chronic diseases, new health events, or health shock, and their financial
consequences received increasing attention. Since health shocks were usually unexpected,
when lacking emergency funds, medical expenses incurred could be a financial threat. For
example, medical expenses on health shock increased with age after controlling for insur-
ance reimbursement [36]. The onset of one severe health event induced OOP expenses as
high as $17,000 [104]. Net worth was reduced up to $200,000 over a period of 16 years by
a severe health shock [95]. Additionally, disparity of the severity of financial consequence
was found: It was more difficult to pay health shock OOP expense for rural households,
older adults and African Americans [2].
Medical expenses from health shocks had a trickle-down effect on a person’s financial
standing, for example, depletion of net worth, forgoing earned income due to poorer health
and OOP expenses from ongoing medical attention on related illnesses [55]. This explained
why buffering financial shocks from health events became a primary reason for saving, or
on the flipside hesitance to spend, among middle-aged and older Americans [36].
In short, in later life, wealth withdrawal began, and health needed more attentive care.
Reconciling financial demands from mortgage payments and medical expenses was crucial
for financial stability. It was unclear whether health impacted mortgage payments. This
study focused on American adults over age 50, examining the effect of health on mortgage
2Among adults age 65+, about 10.7% had no health insurance [114].
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payment: how likely there would be an impact and estimated time to payoff by health.
Results helped to identify from the health perspective “at-risk” individuals for mortgage
difficulty, providing interventions to relieve medical and mortgage burdens among middle-
aged and older Americans.
3.4 Hypothesis
3.4.1 Health Impact on Mortgage Payoff
Medical expenses incurred with health shocks, competing mortgage payment within
limited resources. Mortgage payments, as a result, were either accelerated or jeopardized
depending on household financial situation and decision. Under budget constraint, one
approach to offset medical costs from new health shocks was home sale, with proceeds
paying down mortgage debt. The next step after home sale was sometimes relocation to
nursing homes or senior-friendly apartments. Therefore, the financial decision to sell one’s
home led to a quicker transition to a mortgage-free state. In other words, home sale in the
aftermath of health shock was likely to shorten the duration of carrying mortgage loans,
increasing the likelihood of payoff.
As an alternate approach, a homeowner may turn to a HELOC to defray medical ex-
penses or mortgage payments. An underlying risk was over-withdrawal of home equity,
along with HELOC interest to pay. Should wealth exhaustion occur, delinquency or default
on a mortgage could result in home loss [3], or a faster transition to mortgage termination.
Last, a method to relieve financial strain from health shock and mortgage payments
was to arrange for smaller mortgage payments. Homeowners could modify the mortgage
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for a lower interest rate or deferred payments. They could also refinance to transfer existing
mortgage to a new loan or consolidate current debts into a new single loan. One element
in common with these debt management strategies was smaller payments, implying an ex-
tended repayment timeframe. It therefore took longer to pay off the principal and interest of
a mortgage loan. Hence, in case of health shock and incurrence of medical expenses, mort-
gage payoff was protracted if a person chose refinancing, modification or consolidation.
Overall, health impact onmortgage payoff remained inconclusive. A payoff could either
be accelerated (i.e., increased likelihood) through home sale or HELOC, or slowed down
(i.e., reduced likelihood) if one refinanced, modified, or consolidated the loan. Worth not-
ing, however, older adults displayed a tendency to maintain homeownership; only about
10% of those owning a house (both with and without mortgages) gave up homeowner-
ship [42]. On the one hand, this decision may relate to precautionary or bequest motives,
a factor for using mortgages as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, home was a place of
identity, denoting a sense of security and independence [117]. Emotional attachment may
discourage older people from selling their homes, suggesting that many older adults may
make efforts to avoid home loss and choose to keep their homes even when experiencing
financial hardship. So at this point we presumed that, when health shock occurred, older
adults tended to maintain homeownership and keep their mortgage loans with protracted
payment timeframes.
3.4.2 Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that health shock among middle-aged and older Americans was
likely to reduce likelihood of paying off mortgage loans.
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3.5 Method
3.5.1 Data
This study used data from six biannual waves of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) (2004-2014). The HRS was a longitudinal study of middle-aged and older Ameri-
cans. Information on health situations, including self-rated health, chronic illnesses, health
shocks and health insurance were collected on a sample representing general U.S. popu-
lation. Mortgage status and household financial status, such as income, debts and assets
were covered in the HRS surveys, allowing us to examine the relationship between health
and mortgage payment. Six waves spanned ten years, covering the Great Recession, thus
permitting examination of macroeconomics on household mortgage status.
3.5.2 Sample
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 provided an overview of six-wave homeowners and mort-
gagors. Figure 3.1 showed the trend for homeowners (N = 78,769) with mortgage loans
from Year 2004 to 2014. Over ten years, the percent of homeowners carrying mortgages
remained around 40%, with Year 2010 having the highest mortgage rate of 43% and the
lowest being 38% in Year 2014.
Table 3.1 described respondents having mortgage loans. Among six waves, 10,000
unique mortgagors participated for an average of 3.6 waves, yielding a total observation of
N = 36,194. Over the course of observation, 4,262 respondents (out of 10,000) had paid off
their mortgage loans. Mortgagors on average were 60.5 years old. Group specific, about
38.1% of mortgagors were between ages 50-59, followed by age group 60-69 (36.2%).
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Figure 3.1: Homeowners Having Mortgage across Waves (%).
Note. Therewere 78,769 homeowners in the six-wave dataset. Specifically, numbers of homeowners
ofYears 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 were n = 13,963, n = 12,942, n = 12,185, n = 14,114,
n = 13,248 and n = 12,317.
Of all mortgagors, about one in five (20.2%) fell in age group 70-79. More than half of
mortgagors were Female (54.5%) and the majority were White (77.7%). About 71.6% of
mortgagors were married. “Divorced or separated” and widowed respondents constituted
14.1% and 11.1%, respectively. Regarding health situation, about 40.9% experienced health
shocks within the ten-year period, and the number of health shocks averaged 1.9 per person.
In addition, most mortgagors (90.0%) had an average of two chronic conditions. Compared
with Medicare or Medicaid (43.2%), more mortgagors had employer- or self-purchased pri-
vate insurance (56.8%). In terms of financial status, mortgagors had an average household
income of $75,032 and a mean non-housing equity of $174,209. Mean mortgage outstand-
ing balance was $154,668 and the average mortgage-to-income ratio was 4.3.
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Table 3.1: Description of Mortgagors (obs. = 36,194)
Number of unique respondents 10,000
Payoff observed 4,262
Average waves participated 3.6
Variables All Mortgagors
Demographics
Age (mean, SD) 60.5 8.2
Age group (%)
50-59 38.1
60-69 36.2
70-79 20.2
80-89 5.0
90+ 0.5
Sex (%)
Male 45.5
Female 54.5
Race (%)
White 77.7
Black 15.5
Others 6.8
Marital status (%)
Married 71.6
Divorced/separated 14.1
Widowed 11.1
Others 3.2
Education (mean, SD) 13.3 3.0
Health Situation
Had health shock (%) 40.9
Average number of health shocks 1.9 1.1
Had chronic conditions (%) 90.0
Number of chronic conditions (mean, SD) 2.1 1.4
Had health insurance (%) 79.9
Medicare / Medicaid 43.2
Employer / Self-purchased 56.8
Financial situation (mean, SD)
Household income 75,032 63,052
Non-housing net worth 174,209 304,786
Housing and mortgage status
Mortgage outstanding balance (mean, SD) 154,668 114,194
Balance-to-income ratio (mean) 4.3
Notes. 1. Panel data contained six biannual waves (2004-2014). 2. “Payoff” was defined as
transition from “Hadmortgage” to “Had nomortgage.” 3. Numbers were based on observation;
no censored data were used in calculation. 4. Health shock referred to occurrence of surgery,
unexpected fall, or emergency treatment since last interview. 5. Dollar amounts were in U.S.
currency and were inflation adjusted to Year 2014.
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3.5.3 Measures
Dependent variable. Mortgage payoff as the dependent variable was either observed or
unobserved by the last wave of survey. An observed mortgage payoff referred to a transition
in mortgage status in two (participated) consecutive waves. Specifically, the HRS asked
“Do you have a mortgage, land contract, second mortgage, or any other loan that uses the
property as collateral?” Answers of “Yes, mortgage” preceding “No” in two consecutive
surveys indicated observed payoff, coded “1.” Answers of “Yes, mortgage” by latest wave
suggested that payoff was not yet observed (i.e., censored data), although it could occur in
the future, coded “0.”
Independent variable. Health shocks in this study referred to the onset of a new health
event that occurred between consecutive waves, use of emergency treatment, or unexpected
surgery [116]. To further classify, a dichotomous variable indicating onset of a new health
event was created, with “1” indicating onset of a new health problem, and “0” otherwise.
Regarding chronic conditions, the HRS inquired information on eight types of chronic ill-
nesses commonly seen among older adults: cancer, lung disease, cardiovascular disease,
stroke, diabetes, hypertension, arthritis and psychiatric symptoms. Number of chronic ill-
nesses was grouped, with zero condition coded “1,” one to four conditions grouped and
coded “2” and “3” for five conditions or more. This classification was informed by an ear-
lier study showing that financial strains resulted from the presence of four or more chronic
conditions [93].
Relevant independent variables. Demographic variables of age, sex, marital status,
education and health insurance were included. Financial variables of income, net worth and
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mortgage loan balance-to-income ratio were considered.
3.5.4 Analysis
Age at (observed) mortgage payoff was shown using Wave 2004. Percent of health
shock in eachwavewas then described. Wilcoxon test of equality was performed to describe
statistical difference in mortgage payoff by whether there was a health shock, taking into
account both observed and censored payoff.
Survival analysis was used in regression. Survival analysis featured analyzing the like-
lihood of occurrence of an event, here mortgage payoff and, in case of no observed event,
time to (future) payoff. Both observed and unobserved payoff were used, reducing bias
from eliminating cases whose outcomes were unknown for now but could occur in the
future. Please note that health declined with aging. Survival analysis allowed variables to
change over time, making it possible to detect how payoff was affected by changes in health
over time [4].
In our analysis, each respondent entered with a mortgage, so mortgagors in the sample
were retained for survival regression. For each mortgagor, age at entry and state at entry
(i.e., had mortgage) were recorded. When mortgage payoff was observed, the respondent
exited and did not re-enter (i.e., single non-repeated) the analysis. At this point, his/her
corresponding age and state at exit (i.e., payoff) were recorded. If by latest wave partici-
pated no mortgage payoff occurred, data were censored. Age at last participated wave and
state at exit (i.e., no observed payoff yet) were recorded. Therefore, each mortgagor in the
sample had two “markers”: at entry and at exit; and each “marker” contained two pieces
of information: age and state of mortgage (i.e., had mortgage or payoff had occurred). For
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observed payoff, two age markers produced time duration to its occurrence, and state mark-
ers showed its status transition. For censored payoff, age markers recorded time duration
till last wave, and likewise, state markers kept track of its status. Combining both observed
and censored payoff, the hazard, or probability, of occurrence of event was calculated [27].
Survival analyses were conducted onWave 2004 homeowners only. Specifically, home-
owners at Wave 2004 were identified and were kept track of till their exit. In survival anal-
ysis, Wave 2004 as the first wave in our dataset was advantageous to following waves in a
way that it allowed maximum time (i.e., up to 12 years) to observe whether a respondent’s
mortgage payoff had occurred. In this case, we were able to attain the largest number of
observations (of payoff) relative to unobserved (i.e., censored) payoff, increasing the ro-
bustness of survival estimates.
Three regression models were built: A baseline model containing demographics and
chronic conditions (given the prevalence of chronic conditions among the target popula-
tion), a model with the occurrence of health shock at the top of the baseline model and a
model revamped from the basic model containing duration of health shock to mortgage pay-
off (or, in case of censored “payoff,” duration to last participated wave). Last, for censored
payoff, survival analysis from the above three models further predicted time to payment
completion using follow-up estimation.
3.6 Result
Table 3.2 described 5,421 mortgagors unique to Wave 2004 by mortgage status across
age groups out of 13,963 homeowners. First, on a five-year incremental age scale, it was
indicated that respondents tend to become mortgage-free with increased age. Starting from
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age group 50-54, the majority of homeowners had mortgage loans (70.9%). Reaching ages
60-64, percent of no mortgage loans (51.6%) began to outweigh that of having mortgages
(48.4%), with the corresponding observed mean age at payoff being 67.5 years old. More
than one fourth of homeowners (28.1%) ages 70-74 carried mortgage loans. Mean observed
age at payoff of this group was 76.7 when payoff was observed. Between ages 75-79, nearly
one in five (21.0%) were homeowners with mortgages, and the payoff under observation
was at age 81.0. Second, within the ten-year period, ratio of payoff-to-no payoff demon-
strated a hump shape, starting from 0.73 (ages 50-54), peaking at 0.97 (ages 65-69) and
reducing to 0.53 for age 85+.
Table 3.2: Age Distribution among Wave 2004 Homeowners (N=13,963)
Had Mortgage
(n = 5,421)
All No Ratio of Age at
Age in Homeowners Mortgage No
Payoff
Payoff Payoff/No Payoff
2004 (n) (%) (%) (%) Payoff (mean)
50-54 1,786 29.1 41.1 29.8 0.73 57.9
55-59 1,891 35.6 36.6 27.8 0.76 62.3
60-64 2,306 51.6 25.3 23.1 0.91 67.5
65-69 2,588 60.7 20.0 19.3 0.97 72.0
70-74 2,015 71.9 14.8 13.3 0.90 76.7
75-79 1,494 79.0 12.8 8.2 0.64 81.0
80-84 1,111 86.8 9.0 4.2 0.47 86.8
85+ 772 89.9 6.6 3.5 0.53 90.9
Table 3.3 described health shock experienced by 2004 mortgagors. In 2004, mortgagors
on average were 61.9 years old. Over the ten-year period, as respondents got older, health
shock prevailed, gradually increasing from 13.2% (2004) to 21.3% (2014). Wilcoxon test
of equality showed that the occurrence of mortgage loan payoff had statistical difference by
health shock, χ2 = 31.65, p < .001.
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Table 3.3: Health Shock among Wave 2004 Mortgagors (%)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
(n = 5,421) (n = 5,219) (n = 4,197) (n = 3,407) (n = 2,710) (n = 2,197)
Had Health Shock 13.2 15.9 18.1 18.3 17.9 21.3
Note. Mean age in 2004 was 61.9 years old.
Parametric estimates of hazard of mortgage payoff were shown in Table 3.4. Model 1 in-
cluded mortgagors’ basic information of demographics, financial standing, mortgage status
and chronic conditions. One year older in age (at first observation) increased likelihood of
mortgage loan payoff by 2%, p < .001. Being Black and other racial minorities increased
the hazard of payoff by 22% (p = .003) and 46% (p < .001) over White, respectively.
Compared with the married, the divorced or separated were 19% less likely to pay off the
loan (p = .005). Each additional year in education decreased hazard by 4% (p < .001).
Compared with loan-to-income ratio < 1, a loan-to-income ratio > = 1 reduced the hazard of
payoff. That is, having a ratio of 1-3, 3-5 and 5+ decreased the hazard by 48% (p < .001),
45% (p < .001) and 50% (p < .001). Having health insurance reduced the likelihood of
payoff by 35% than the not insured. One unit increase in log income decreased the hazard
by 14% (p < .001). One additional unit in log non-housing equity increased the hazard
by 1% (p = .016). Having 5-8 chronic illnesses reduced likelihood of mortgage payoff
by 22% (p = .021). In post-2008 waves, mortgage payoff was 14.6 times more likely to
occur than in pre-2008 years.
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Model 2 was built on Model 1 by adding whether or not a mortgagor experienced health
shock. The result showed that health shock reduced the hazard by 22% (p < .001).
Different from Model 1, chronic health conditions did not statistically affect likelihood of
mortgage payoff. Other factors were similar to Model 1. Factors that statistically increased
hazard of payoff were higher age (HR= 1.03, p < .001), Black (HR = 1.20, p < .006)
and other racial minorities (HR = 1.45, p < .001), higher non-housing equity (HR = 1.01,
p = .017) and post-2008 years (HR = 14.47, p < .001). Contrarily, divorce or marital
separation (HR = 0.82, p = .007), additional year in education (HR = 0.96, p < .001),
loan-to-income ratios larger than one (i.e., ratio 1-3, HR = 0.52, p < .001; ratio 3-5, HR
= 0.54, p < .001; ratio 5+, HR = 0.50, p < .001), had health insurance (HR = 0.65,
p < .001) and one more unit in log income (HR = 0.85, p < .001) decreased hazard of
payoff.
Model 3 was also built onModel 1 by including time duration between first health shock
and mortgage payoff or, in case of no payoff observed, last wave of observation. Results
showed that one more year in time duration since the occurrence of health shock reduced
the hazard by 6% (p < .001). Similar to Model 1, variables that increased likelihood of
payoff were higher age (HR= 1.03, p < .001), Black (HR = 1.19, p = .011) and other
racial minorities (HR = 1.44, p < .001), higher non-housing equity (HR = 1.01, p = .025)
and years after 2008 (HR = 14.07, p < .001). Conversely, factors that reduced the hazard
of mortgage payoff were being divorced or separated (HR = 0.81, p = .006), one more
year in education (HR = 0.96, p < .001), loan-to-income ratios larger than one (i.e., ratio
1-3, HR = 0.52, p < .001; ratio 3-5, HR = 0.54, p < .001; ratio 5+, HR = 0.50, p < .001),
had health insurance (HR = 0.66, p < .001) and one additional unit in log income (HR =
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0.85, p < .001). Chronic conditions had no impact on hazard of mortgage payoff.
Until now, regression models estimated hazard, or likelihood, of mortgage payoff using
both observed and censored data. Next, as a follow-up procedure, regression Model 1 was
applied to censored data—namely, those who had not yet paid off the loan by the end of
survey—to calculate expected time to payoff. Figure 3.2 showed the predicted mean time to
mortgage payoff for all mortgagorswith 95% confidence interval. Overall, starting from age
50, time to mortgage payoff showed a descending trend, with slight fluctuations. In other
words, the higher a mortgagor’s age, the less time it would take to pay down the mortgage
loan. On average, it would take a mortgagor at age 50 10.26 years to complete the loan
payment. Mean time to payoff for a 55- and a 60- year old mortgagor were estimated to be
10.04 years and 9.19 years, respectively. Mortgage loans of a 65- and 70-year old individual
were expected to be paid down in 8.80 and 8.73 years.
Model 2 was also applied to censored data as a follow-up estimate on expected time to
payoff depending on occurrence of health shock. Figure 3.3 showed mean time to mortgage
loan payoff by health shock. First, group comparison by health shock showed that, on
average, those experiencing health shocks were expected to spend a longer time to pay
off their mortgage than counterparts of the same age with no health shock. Specifically,
a mortgagor of age 50 with no health shock was predicted to take 10.22 years to payoff;
and, in case of health shock, 10.40 years. At age 60, a mortgagor without health shock
was expected to take 9.07 years to complete payments, while 60-year-old counterparts with
health shock would take 9.32 years to payoff (+0.25 yrs). At age 70, mean time to payoff
was predicted to be 8.47 (no shock) and 8.82 (had shock) years (+0.35 yrs), respectively.
As shown by the above description, between mortgagors with and without health shocks,
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Figure 3.2: Prediction on Time (Mean) to Mortgage Payoff with 95% Confidence Interval.
mean time to mortgage loan payoff was predicted to widen with older age.
3.7 Discussion
This paper focuses on American adults age 50 and older and investigates health impact
on likelihood of mortgage payoff. It is instructive that we include both health shock and
chronic conditions, and examine this relationship from two aspects: first, depending on
health, what is the likelihood of mortgage payoff; and second, what is the estimated time
to payoff by mortgagors’ health condition? We find that likelihood of mortgage payoff
depends crucially on health: both chronic condition and health shock reduces likelihood
of paying off a mortgage by 22%. And expected payoff time (for current mortgagors) is
postponed 2 to 10 months with a health shock, with older people experiencing a longer
70
Figure 3.3: Prediction on Time (Mean) to Mortgage Payoff by Health Shock with 95%
Confidence Interval.
delay. These novel findings provide important enrichment to debt research on middle-
aged and older Americans, showing that, aside from wealth depletion [64] and unsecured
debts [122], health shock and chronic disease also threatens secured loans by reducing like-
lihood of mortgage payment completion. Hence, given declined health with aging, endeav-
oring to pay off a mortgage for financial security is just as vital as deleveraging of unse-
cured debts—before deterioration of physical health and incurrence of unexpected medical
expenses.
In order to answer the first research question, three survival models (including both ob-
served and censored payoff) are built for a step-by-step examination: a base model with
chronic condition and demographics, a model with occurrence of health shock at the top
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of the baseline model and a model augmenting the base model by including duration from
latest health shock to observed payoff. In particular, in the absence of health shock, having
5 to 8 types of chronic illnesses, compared with having no chronic condition, reduces pay-
off likelihood by 22%, and having 1-4 types decreases likelihood by 12%3. Considering
that over 90% of older people’s medical expenses go toward chronic illnesses [23], it is not
surprising that chronic disease inhibits mortgage payoff, likely through financial loss from
OOP expenses or forgone earned income from unemployment [55]. In addition, expenses
from chronic condition tend to incur over the entire later life given its needs for continuing
attentive care. Without adequate resources, a person may have little resilience to make fi-
nancial adjustments, resulting in budget constraint. In this circumstance, mortgage payment
disruption—for example, late or missed payments—could occur, decreasing likelihood of
mortgage payoff.
Next, when factoring in health shock, effects from chronic conditions diminish; health
shock as the prominent predictor reduces likelihood of payoff by 22%. Health shock, usu-
ally unanticipated, generates high medical costs, leaving little time for patients and fam-
ilies to prepare financially should there not be enough emergency funds or credit to bor-
row. For example, in 2011, average OOP cost of emergency department (ED) visit was
$1,354 in the U.S. [101], which exceeds average monthly Social Security benefit of $1,241
in 20114 [106]. In this situation, an individual may have to trade off mortgage payments
for paying health shock medical bills, so as to have a tentative “cushion” to buffer this
financial shock. In other words, mortgage payments may be a concession to medical ex-
3Having 1-4 types of chronic condition is marginally statistically significant with a p-value of .057.
4In 2011 U.S. currency, for a single worker retired at age 65
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penses when health shock suddenly occurs, resulting in interrupted mortgage payments and
reduced likelihood to pay off mortgage debts.
Third, the test of lingering effect of health shock on paying one’s mortgage indicates
that each two-year increase5 in duration since (latest) health shock reduces likelihood of
mortgage payoff by 6%. Counterintuitively, once paying the medical bills in full, a per-
son is free from further financial obligation; thus, its impact on mortgage payoff should
decrease. However, informed by previous research, health shock is rarely extricated from
existing chronic illnesses—ED treatment or surgery is oftentimes a consequence of sudden
deterioration of chronic symptoms. Therefore, continuation to control chronic disease or
complications in the aftermath of health shock may negatively impact one’s budget, impos-
ing financial strain over time, and eventually threatening successful mortgage completion.
For example, infection induced by arthritis, a type of chronic disease affecting 23% of U.S.
adults [21], accounts for 24.7% of ED visits [80]. This indirectly testifies to our finding
stated above that chronic conditions deter mortgage payoff. Therefore, given our findings,
impact of health shock on lower mortgage payoff likelihood possibly has two mechanisms:
one in itself, and another through its interwoven relationship with associated chronic con-
ditions.
In addition to health, a few factors predicting likelihood of mortgage payoff are worth
mentioning. First, non-housing equity in the forms of savings and investment promotes
mortgage payoff by 1% after controlling for health, suggesting that should there be a health
problem, wealth as a buffer capital is crucial to get over financial shocks. The small mag-
nitude of impact may be interpreted as hesitance to release wealth for debt repayment out
5The HRS collects data every two years.
73
of precautionary motive [19] or a bequest motive to leave a legacy [51].
Furthermore, health insurance surprisingly interferes with the progress of mortgage pay-
ments. A closer look into the sample reveals that effects are age-specific. Beyond age 64,
the transition stage to using Medicare, health insurance has no profound impact. Before
age 64, however, health insurance reduces likelihood of mortgage payoff, implying that
premiums, deductibles, or co-pays on employer-sponsored or privately-purchased health
insurance may be high enough to compete with other financial needs such as mortgage pay-
ments. Moreover, after 2008, likelihood of mortgage payoff is 14 times higher than before
2008, suggesting that “mortgage-free” may in some cases mean an involuntary mortgage
termination from home foreclosure.
Moving to the second research question on estimating time to pay off a mortgage for
censored observation, overall, all mortgagors considered, expected time to payoff shortens
with increasing age (with minor fluctuations). In other words, the general trend shows that,
the higher the age, the less time it takes to reach payoff. For example, a mortgagor of age
55 pays off the loan in 10.0 years, at around 65 years old. Payoff ages for a 65- and a
70-year-old is 73.8 (+8.8 years) and 78.7 (+8.7 years), respectively. Note, however, that
the expected time to payoff is not proportional to the mortgagor’s age. As shown in the
above example of a 65- and a 70- year old, their age differential of 5 years corresponds to
only 1-month difference. This finding deserves more attention, since it indicates that older
mortgagors are approaching mortgage payoff at a slower pace than younger counterparts,
implying ever-increasing difficulty to make mortgage payments and financial vulnerability
in general among senior mortgagors.
Further examination by health shock shows a novel finding: health shock impedes mort-
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gage payoff, and the delay in payoff (from health shock) widens with older age. For ex-
ample, a 60-year-old without and with health shock waits 9.1 and 9.3 years until mortgage
payoff, a postponement of about three months. Having and not having health shock for
a 75-year-old mortgagor correspond to 7.6 and 8.4 years, respectively, to mortgage pay-
off, producing a 10-month delay. Therefore, a conclusion is that impact of health shock
on reduced likelihood of mortgage payoff exacerbates with older age, testifying again to
financial insecurity and mortgage burden among older Americans.
Whereas this paper provides clear evidence on negative impact of health shock on mort-
gage payment completion, future work in this field may be advanced in the following as-
pects. First, OOP6 expenses if included in estimates will help to understand how actual
expenditures influence mortgage payments and to what extent. In this paper, however, by
factoring in OOP, size of observation drastically decreased from 18,338 to 1,606, with no
observed mortgage payoff, so we cannot perform survival analysis. Second, mortgage pay-
off as a state of being mortgage-free results either from successful payment completion or
home loss from foreclosure or other unspecified reasons. These situations may be further
distinguished to identify voluntary and involuntary mortgage discontinuation.
3.8 Implication
Undoubtedly, the worst situation of mortgage default or lengthy payment timeframe
is home loss, imperiling the already financially fragile elder population. Therefore, given
the prevalence of chronic illnesses (e.g., about 45.7% have at least one) and frequency of
6The HRS collects OOP on four categories of hospital treatment, surgery cost, nursing home cost and
doctor visit.
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health shock (e.g., about one in six have shock each wave) and limited financial resources
in general, education tailored specifically to those having health issues is greatly needed.
The primary teaching goal is to speed up mortgage payment, regardless of whether health
shock has occurred or not. To break down this teaching goal, two steps may be taken.
First, information should be delivered to seniors on the adverse impact of health shock on
potential mortgage difficulty. Many mortgagors simply do not know that their mortgage
payment could be in peril if their health worsens, and few can anticipate the occurrence
of health shock. When equipped with such knowledge, people at least would have some
perception on their mortgage status given their age and self-rated health, making them less
likely to be completely unprepared in the event of health shock. Second, on this knowledge
basis, strategies for managing mortgage debts may be offered. Prioritizing financial needs
is a good start. For example, some financial aspects to be evaluated include emergency
funds (e.g., enough or not), savings (e.g., save more), unnecessary expenses (e.g., cut them
back). Eventually seniors may allocate any surplus funds to increase mortgage payments
in order to pay it off earlier. By doing so, under the same resources, budget adjustment to
avoid delay in payoff may be achieved.
One final concern is exacerbated financial vulnerability to mortgage burden among se-
nior mortgagors, who are approaching mortgage completion at a much slower pace than
younger borrowers with similar health. Policy makers may consider extra tax benefits
through mortgage interest deduction for those having health shock or multiple chronic con-
ditions (e.g., more than five types). Of course, seniors tend to fall into a lower marginal
tax bracket due to smaller income. For those having health issues, however, their financial
standing may be further ameliorated through a higher deduction limit. For example, start-
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ing from 2018, the deduction limit is $10,000 [53]. Raising this limit for mortgagors age
75 and older may better accommodate seniors given their declining health and mortgage
interest payments.
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
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CHAPTER 4. REVERSE MORTGAGEAND FINANCIAL SATISFACTION
AMONG OLDERAMERICANS
4.1 Abstract
Reverse mortgage was a financial product allowing the homeowner access to home eq-
uity. Borrowing against their own housing wealth, older homeowners obtained payments
to add to their savings and pensions, thus mitigating liquidity constraint in later years. The
latest descriptive work contrasted financial situations before and after use of reverse mort-
gages, but studies investigating their impact on older borrowers’ financial wellbeing were
still limited. This paper as an important accession examined whether reverse mortgages
contributed to increased financial satisfaction among borrowers, while quantifying the mag-
nitude of the impact. Fourwaves (2010-2016) of theHealth andRetirement Studywere used
to build fixed-effects models. Evidence clearly suggested improved financial situations
from using reverse mortgages. On a 1-5 scale, financial and income satisfaction increased
by 0.46 and 0.69, and difficulty paying bills decreased by 0.77; financial strain decreased
by 0.69 on 1-4 measuring scale. Additionally, financial wellbeing was more likely to be
ameliorated for seniors beyond age 80 and respondents whose income exceeded 150% of
the federal poverty line. Implications on utilizing reverse mortgage as a source of income
to fund retirement were discussed.
Keywords: reverse mortgage, financial satisfaction, liquidity constraint, older home-
owners
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4.2 Introduction
In studying conditions of retirement, an important question to ask was whether a retiree
had enough money to sustain a comfortable life. Retirement on one’s own terms faced
the retiree with challenges such as inadequate wealth or savings, rising cost of living and
longevity. Among others, one key factor was lack of liquid assets, which could easily be
converted into cash for daily expenses and emergencies. When a household was short of
cash1, budgets tightened, resulting in liquidity constraint [31].
Home equity constituted a large share of household wealth. Yet, lockup of home equity
was an issue confronting many homeowners, as equity could not be liquidated until home
sale, which took time. Therefore, seniors may experience financial strain when wealth was
in large part stored as home equity and liquid assets were few. Put another way, not having
enough cash and lockup of home equity created a situation called “house rich, cash poor.”
As commonly seen, despite having a home and some savings, many older Americans had
financial pressure to sustain the standard of living they had in working years [52].
Reversemortgage loans, a financial product available for homeowners age 62 and above,
provided a scheme to liquidate one’s home equity. By taking a reverse mortgage, a person
borrowed against his equity, which was released and converted to liquid assets by a lender,
and then paid to the borrower. In other words, one’s home equity was unlocked by re-
verse mortgage, providing cash for retirement. For elder persons hampered by low liquid
assets, reverse mortgages could help. Theoretically, smooth consumption across lifespan
maximized utility under lifetime wealth. Thus, to keep consumption levels constant across
1In this paper, cash referred to cash and near-cash items including money in checking and savings ac-
counts.
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all life stages, it was necessary to transfer surplus assets from working years to times of
inadequate income [85]. In practice, reverse mortgage loans made it possible to allocate
accumulated home equity to retirement when income was generally low, maximizing sat-
isfaction through intertemporal asset transfer. In addition, compared with home equity line
of credit (HELOC), reverse mortgage loans had fewer requirements on borrowers’ income
or credit rating, accommodating seniors’ financial situations. The lender began to collect
repayments when the borrower deceased or moved out of the house. Therefore, borrowers
felt little stress for repayment while they continued residing in their homes [103]. Lastly,
living on one’s own lessened reliance on social welfare or financial help-seeking [46, 50],
denoting independence and a sense of autonomy [58,121].
Overall, releasing equity for consumption in later years was assumed to be economi-
cally desirable; reverse mortgage loans, if used rationally, had financial and psychological
advantages. Nevertheless, only one out of seven qualified borrowers chose reverse mort-
gage. Examination was needed on the change in wellbeing resulting from reverse mort-
gages. Building on recent descriptive work comparing financial conditions before and after
using a reverse mortgage loan [87], this paper advanced the research by investigating the
impact of reverse mortgage on borrowers’ financial health. Specifically, was enhanced fi-
nancial satisfaction an effect of taking a reverse mortgage loan? Second, to what extent did
reverse mortgages increase financial satisfaction?
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4.3 Literature Review
4.3.1 Retirement Wealth Components
Retirement wealth mainly consisted of Social Security benefits, pensions, savings and
home equity. In 2017, the average monthly Social Security benefit was $1,3602 [107]. For
pre-retirees ages 51-56, all savings accounts included3, retirement savings had a mean of
$220,7004, but the median was substantially lower, being $47,500. Home equity, the market
value of a house minus anymortgage debt, averaged $127,280 and had amedian of $68,000.
In all, mean retirement net worth was approximately $387,000. Due to wealth disparity and
inequality, median net worth was less than half of that, being $152,000 [76].
As people got older, wealth composition gradually changed. Home equity took a larger
share in total household wealth, whereas the proportion of financial assets shrank. For
example, adults ages 62-75 had $177,800 average savings, with the median being $14,000.
At the same time, mean home equity was $281,000, and median home equity was $115,000
[72].
Therefore, for elder persons with limited monetary assets, home equity became a main
component of retirement wealth. Of course, under motives of precaution and bequest, older
people were reluctant to release equity, since a home was treated as a buffer capital, a valu-
able possession, or a sign of “retirement in place.” However, in order to meet consumption
needs, older adults’ equity may inevitably be released to mitigate tight budget.
2In 2017 U.S. currency, and all retired workers included
3Including pensions, 401(k) or similar plans and Individual Retirement Account (IRA)
4In 2004 U.S. currency
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4.3.2 Reverse Mortgage Loans
Reverse mortgage. A reverse mortgage loan was a type of home equity loan for home-
owners beyond age 62. With a traditional mortgage, consumers borrowed to buy a home,
and paid it back using future income. For reverse mortgages, homeowners borrowed against
their own equity and received either monthly or lump sum payments from the lender [63].
Loan repayment began when the borrower no longer occupied the residence (e.g., deceased
or moved out). To repay the loan, the home was sold. Proceeds were then used to pay
capital and interest [43].
Total loan amount was primarily determined by the appraised home value minus related
fees and costs. On average, borrowers received amaximum of 80% of the appraised housing
price [91]. Reverse mortgage loans offered diverse payment options. Generally, lump sum
payments were more popular than monthly payments, which was helpful in case of financial
shocks [103].
A risk for both borrowers and lenders were falling home prices. When home values
depreciated, sales did not generate enough proceeds to cover capital and interest. Borrowers
then did not receive enough money to pay back the loan and the lender was not paid in full.
To prevent a lose-lose situation, lenders and borrowers were required to purchase insurance
from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). FHA insurance protected lenders from
consumer default on loan repayment. At the borrowers’ end, insurance reimbursed the
difference if home sale did not fully repay their loan.
The working mechanism of a reverse mortgage was similar to a HELOC, but reverse
mortgages were tailored to fit older people’s financial situations. Unlike HELOCs requiring
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decent income and prime credit, reverse mortgages imposed fewer restrictions [48]. Since
approval of reverse mortgages relied more on home value and less on income credentials,
it was more suitable for older borrowers living on fixed incomes [82].
Use of reverse mortgages among older homeowners. Recent trends showed remark-
able growth in use of reverse mortgages—from 0.2% in 1997 to 1.4% in 2009, which in-
creased further to 2.1% in 2011, with the highest increase seen at age 62 [92]. Although
the number of reverse mortgage borrowers was still small, its soaring rate at age 62, the
minimum qualifying age, implied rising demand to tap into home equity [38]. Households
who chose reverse mortgages shared similar characteristics. For example, being single or
widowed [43], having consumer debt [71] and having financial needs to cover property
taxes [67].
On the other hand, the small percentage of those using reverse mortgages reflected older
people’s prudence about releasing home equity. Previous work pointed out drawbacks of
reverse mortgages. For example, early and unnecessary depletion of equity was a shortcom-
ing. In addition, lump sum payments could be an enticement for consumption, encouraging
splurging, and thus deterring retirement saving among near-retirees [111]. Under most re-
verse mortgage terms, borrowers needed to begin repaying the loan if moving out. Consid-
ering the possibility of relocation, for example, downsizing or moving to nursing homes,
the contracted “lock-in” in the residence was unfavorable to potential borrowers [24].
Despite the downsides, empirical evidence showed an array of benefits from using a
reverse mortgage loan. “Financial cushion” was a main economic advantage [120]. For
example, a primary reason for using reverse mortgages was to pay healthcare costs, includ-
ing unexpected medical expenses [92] and financing long-term care or end-of-life arrange-
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ments [33]. These findings were consistent with results showing that older adults with lower
self-rated health were more likely to take reverse mortgages [25]. Psychologically, since
older adults needed not to move out of the house, they earned a sense of belonging [66].
Reverse mortgages also allowed seniors to live on their own, bringing autonomy from less
reliance on social welfare [90] and financial independence from reduced help-seeking [46].
In sum, there was evidence on reasons for using reverse mortgages, both benefits and
drawbacks, from economic and psychological viewpoints. Releasing home equity in later
years was a serious financial decision that required careful assessment, as the consequence
of equity exhaustion was almost irreversible if used irrationally. Therefore, it was cru-
cial to understand if reverse mortgages enhanced borrowers’ financial wellbeing. In other
words, did reverse mortgages increase seniors’ financial satisfaction? Answers to this ques-
tion could provide recommendations on managing wealth, helping seniors to improve their
quality of life while reducing the risk of unnecessary wealth depletion.
4.4 Theoretical Framework
The classical economic model of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) assumed that con-
sumer utility or satisfaction was a function of current and future consumption. Each per-
son’s lifetime resources, including income and wealth, were limited. Therefore, in order to
maximize lifetime utility, an optimum method was to smooth consumption across the lifes-
pan, keeping constant marginal utility. This was achieved by evenly distributing wealth and
income across all life stages. To that end, a rational person was expected to save when in-
come exceeded expenses, and to spend when income was not enough to maintain a similar
standard of living [12]. In a nutshell, intertemporal transfer of wealth accumulated in work-
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ing years to retirement when living primarily on fixed incomes was economically ideal for
utility maximization [85].
Home equity, or housing capital, was a major component of older adults’ household
wealth [52]. It was accumulated through mortgage payments over time. The mechanism of
reverse mortgages was an application of the LCH. It enabled intertemporal resource transfer
of equity accrued earlier in life to retirement, helping to maintain the same consumption
level in retirement years and maximizing borrowers’ lifetime satisfaction [97, 100, 103].
Hypothesis 1
It was hypothesized that a borrower was likely to have less financial constraint after
taking a reverse mortgage loan.
Hypothesis 2
It was hypothesized that a borrower was likely to experience increased financial satis-
faction after taking a reverse mortgage loan.
4.5 Method
4.5.1 Data
This study used longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Starting
from 1992, HRS surveyed a representative sample of American adults over age 50 every
two years, collecting information onAmericans’ work, retirement planning and wealth. The
variable of reverse mortgage was first introduced in Wave 2010 and was available through
the latest wave. In addition to the abundance of economic variables, the HRS strengthened
its measurement on psychological status related to household financial situation. In 2004,
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the Leave Behind (LB) questionnaire was added to core HRS face-to-face interviews5 to
inquire about individuals’ psychological health and general wellbeing in multiple life do-
mains. The LB survey was conducted on a (rotating) randomly selected subsample drawn
from core face-to-face interviewees. Therefore, sample size of LB in each wave was sub-
stantially smaller than the size in corresponding core interviews [112]. LB questionnaire
covered satisfaction with household financial situations and financial strains, main depen-
dent variables in this study. Four waves from 2010- 2016 were used to merge into a panel
dataset. Since homeowners became eligible for reverse mortgages loans at age 62, panel
data were further refined by retaining homeowners age 62 and beyond.
4.5.2 Sample
Four waves of data had a total of 37,797 responses from 13,231 homeowners age 62+.
As shown in Table 4.1, mortgage-free homeowners included 8,097 unique respondents par-
ticipating in an average 2.8 waves. Next, 4,919 respondents had a traditional mortgage, and
they participated in 2.9 waves. Reverse mortgage borrower group contained 215 unique
respondents, accounting for 1.62% of the sample, on average participating in 3.2 waves.
5The HRS also conducted telephone interviews and mail surveys.
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For the no-mortgage group, average age was 75.1, and nearly half (44.0%) were be-
tween 70 to 79 years old. About 57.0% were female, and the majority (83.4%) wereWhite.
Married respondents constituted 62.2%. This group of respondents had 12.6 years of educa-
tion. Sample had a mean household income of $50,252. Home equity averaged $178,822
and non-housing net worth was $149,079. Respondents with traditional mortgage loans
were 70.0 years old, half of whom (51.0%) were in the 62 to 69 age group. Nearly 52.7%
were female, 77.3% wereWhite and 69.9% were married. Average years of education were
13.6. Annual household income was $75,053. Net worth in home equity and non-housing
assets were $104,968 and $124,317, respectively. Regarding the reverse-mortgage group,
respondents were on average 76.3 years old, andmore than half (51.8%) were in the 70 to 79
age bracket. About 56.3% were female. White and married respondents constituted 77.2%
and 48.4% of the subsample, respectively. Education attainment was 12.7 years. Annual
household income was $42,773, with home equity being $199,673. Non-housing financial
net worth was $75,085.
In short, reversemortgage borrowerswere older than no-mortgage and traditional-mortgage
counterparts, with half of them between ages 70-79. In addition, the reverse mortgage group
had a higher proportion of single-household respondents (i.e., divorced, separated, or wid-
owed. Average home equity of reverse mortgagors was the highest of all three subgroups;
in contrast, their non-housing net worth was the lowest, representing a profile of “house
rich, cash poor.”
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4.5.3 Measures
Dependent variables. Financial satisfaction was measured using two variables: satis-
faction with household income and satisfaction with financial situation. Two corresponding
questions were “How satisfied are you with the total income of your household?” and “How
satisfied are youwith your present financial situation?” Answers on a five-point Likert scale
included “Completely satisfied,” coded “1” to “Not at all satisfied,” coded “5.” They were
further reverse coded for straightforward interpretation. Aside from satisfaction, liquidity
constraint was also estimated to detect the effect of reverse mortgages. Two variables were
“difficulty paying bills” and “financial strain.” To measure “difficulty paying bills,” the
question, “How difficult is it for you to meet your monthly payments on bills?” was asked.
Answers on a five-point Likert scale varied from “Not at all difficult,” coded “1”, to “Com-
pletely difficult,” coded “5.” Next, “financial strain” was measured using the question,
“Please indicate how upsetting your financial strain has been in the last twelve months.”
Four choices were “No, did not happen,” coded “1,” “Yes, but not upsetting,” coded “2,”
“Yes, somewhat upsetting,” coded “3” and “Yes, very upsetting,” coded 4.”
Independent variables. A binary independent variable of whether or not having a
reverse mortgage at the time of interview was used. The question “Do you have a mortgage,
land contract, second mortgage, or any other loan that uses the property as collateral?” was
asked. The answer of “Respondent has reverse mortgage” indicated that the participant had
a reverse mortgage loan when surveyed, coded “1” and otherwise “0.”
Relevant independent variables. Other independent variables were whether a respon-
dent had a traditional mortgage, respondent’s annual income, household net worth and de-
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mographic information. To measure health status, respondents were asked to indicate their
current self-rated health using “Excellent,” “Very good,” “Good,” “Fair” and “Poor,” coded
from “1” to “5.”
4.5.4 Analysis
The first step was to describe dependent variables of financial satisfaction (i.e., satis-
faction with household income and satisfaction with financial situation) and financial con-
straint (i.e., financial strain and difficulty paying bills). Particularly, among three subgroups
of “mortgage-free,” “had traditional mortgage” and “had reverse mortgage,” the mean of
the four dependent variables was shown, using data from the first waves of 2010 and the
latest wave of 2016. Next, focus of analysis switched from all homeowners (62+) to reverse-
mortgage respondents, aiming to demonstrate how four dependent variables changed over
time among borrowers, from 2010 – 2016.
Comparison was also conducted descriptively on financial satisfaction and liquidity
constraint before and after taking a reverse mortgage. Since our focus was to ascertain
changes after using a reverse mortgage, this series of figures included only respondents
who started with “having no reverse mortgage” and in any of the following waves “had a
reverse mortgage.” In addition, given the sampling strategy of the HRS LB questionnaire
mentioned earlier, LB had a drastically smaller sample size than the HRS core interviews.
So, across four waves, approximately thirty unique reverse mortgage borrowers6 fulfilled
the requirements for this description: first, started with no reverse mortgage and thereafter
took a reverse mortgage loan; second, had responses for dependent variables both before
6Out of a total of 215 unique reverse mortgagors (see Table 4.1)
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and after using the loan (See Appendix B).
Multicollinearity was checked to avoid correlation between financial variables. To ex-
amine whether any change in financial satisfaction was an effect of using reversemortgages,
fixed-effects regression was performed. Fixed-effects models adopted a differentiating pro-
cess, eliminating time-invariant characteristics such as sex and race, allowing us to detect
whether change in a dependent variable was statistically related to change in independent
variables. Hausman test yielded χ2 (11) = 27.71, p < .001, indicating that data structure
fit fixed-effects models [119]. Four fixed-effects regression models were estimated, with
each model containing one of the four dependent variables of “Satisfaction with financial
situation,” “Satisfaction with household income,” “Financial strain” and “Difficulty paying
bills.” Models detected whether changes in above four dependent variables were ascribed
to changes in predictors. Thus, any respondents participating in two waves or more who
showed differential values in both independent and dependent variables were usable in re-
gression.
4.6 Result
Table 4.2 displayed senior homeowners’ financial situations in two selected waves—the
first wave of 2010 and the last wave of 2016. Financial strain, difficulty paying bills, sat-
isfaction with household income and satisfaction with financial situation7 were described
group-specific: mortgage-free, had traditional mortgage and had reverse mortgage. Com-
7“Financial strain” was measured on a scale from 1 (“No, did not happen”) to 4 (“Yes, very upsetting”).
“Difficulty paying bills” was measured on a scale from 1 (“Not at all difficult”) to 5 (“Completely diffi-
cult”). “Satisfaction with household income” was measured on a scale from 1 (“Not at all satisfied”) to 5
(“Completely satisfied”). “Satisfaction with financial situation” was measured on a scale from 1 (“Not at all
satisfied”) to 5 (“Completely satisfied”).
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pared with Table 4.1, drop in sample size in each group was ascribed to sampling of LB
survey, which was conducted on a portion of randomly selected core HRS respondents.
First, for financial strain, in both years, reverse mortgagors experienced the highest finan-
cial strain among all three groups. In 2010, reverse mortgagors’ mean strain was 2.02
(SD = 1.01), whereas traditional mortgage borrowers and no-mortgage counterparts had
mean strains of 1.81 (SD = 0.96) and 1.44 (SD = 0.77), respectively. Wave 2016 had the
same pattern. Reverse-mortgage group had a mean strain of 1.90 (SD = 1.02), which was
larger than mean strains for traditional borrowers (M = 1.79, SD = 0.94) and mortgage-free
group (M = 1.46, SD = 0.76). Cross-sectionally, comparing 2010 with 2016, mean financial
strain decreased for reverse mortgage borrowers from 2.02 (SD = 1.01) to 1.90 (SD = 1.02).
Traditional borrowers’ strain slightly alleviated, while the mortgage-free group had a slim
increase in financial strain.
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Next, regarding difficulty paying bills, in both waves, reverse mortgage borrowers had
the most difficulty among three subgroups. In 2010, mean difficulty rated by reverse mort-
gagors was 2.39 (SD = 1.10), higher than 1.68 (SD = 0.86) among mortgage-free respon-
dents and 2.02 (SD = 1.01) of the traditional mortgage group. Likewise, 2016 followed the
same pattern. Mean difficulty for reverse mortgagors of 2.25 (SD = 1.24) was higher than
that of no-mortgage (M = 2.02, SD = 1.01) and traditional mortgage borrowers (M = 1.94,
SD = 0.96). In addition, comparison between 2010 and 2016 showed that reverse mortgage
respondents had decreased difficulty paying bills from 2.39 (SD = 1.10) to 2.25 (SD = 1.24),
so had traditional mortgage borrowers. Contrarily, no-mortgage group experienced higher
difficulty paying bills.
Third, regarding income satisfaction, reverse mortgage borrowers had a mean income
satisfaction score of 3.23 (SD = 1.25) in 2016, which increased from 2.98 (SD = 1.18)
in 2010. In contrast, both traditional mortgagors and no-mortgage counterpart showed a
reduction in income satisfaction from 3.25 in 2010 (SD = 1.12) to 3.21 (SD = 1.12) in 2016
and from 3.64 (SD = 1.05) in 2010 to 3.60 in 2016 (SD = 1.06), respectively. Despite an
increase of reverse mortgagors’ income satisfaction, it was still relatively low among the
subgroups. In 2010, reverse mortgagors’ mean satisfaction of 2.98 (SD = 1.18) ranked the
lowest. Mortgage-free counterparts had the highest income satisfaction (M = 3.64, SD =
1.05), followed by the traditional mortgage group’s mean of 3.25 (SD = 1.12). In 2016, no-
mortgage respondents still had the highest income satisfaction of the three (M = 3.60, SD =
1.06). Reverse mortgagors’ satisfaction level ranked second (M = 3.23, SD = 1.25), while
the traditional mortgage group were on average least satisfied with income (M = 3.21, SD
= 1.12).
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Finally, in terms of satisfaction with financial situation, reverse mortgage was the only
subgroup showing an increase, from a mean of 3.09 (SD = 1.10) in 2010 to 3.33 (SD = 1.24)
in 2016. The other two groups experienced reductions. Specifically, traditional mortgage
borrowers’ satisfaction dropped from a mean of 3.28 (SD = 1.09) in 2010 to 3.27 (SD =
1.06) in 2016. Mortgage-free counterparts’ 2010 mean of 3.74 (SD = 1.01) reduced to 3.69
(SD = 1.01) in 2016. In spite of its increase, reverse mortgage borrowers, however, were
not the most satisfied with their financial situation. In 2010, their mean of 3.09 (SD = 1.10)
was lower than traditional mortgagors’ mean of 3.28 (SD = 1.09) and no-mortgage group’s
mean of 3.74 (SD = 1.01). In 2016, reverse mortgagors’ mean of 3.33 (SD = 1.24), although
higher than that of the traditional mortgage group (M = 3.27, SD = 1.06), but was still lower
than the mean of mortgage-free counterparts (M = 3.69, SD = 1.01).
As noted earlier, the next step was to focus on reverse mortgage borrowers and to
demonstrate their change in financial situation across four waves, shown in Figures 4.1a
4.1b and 4.1c. Figure 4.1a displayed trends of satisfaction with financial situation and with
household income. Over six years, two satisfaction domains showed similar fluctuating pat-
terns, hitting the trough in 2014 and peaking in 2016. On a 1-5 measuring scale, financial
satisfaction started from 3.09 in 2010, being equal in 2012, and then in 2014 plummeted to
2.80. In 2016, it bounced back to 3.33, the highest point of all waves. Income satisfaction,
also measured on a 1-5 scale, started from 2.98 in 2010 and slightly increased to 3.03 in
2012. A reduction to 2.66 was seen in 2014 and eventually rose to the highest of 3.23 in
2016.
Figure 4.1b depicted reverse mortgagors’ financial strain over time. Financial strain
demonstrated a fluctuating trend, in a reverse direction than satisfactions. On a 1-4 measur-
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(a) Reverse Mortgage Borrowers’ Financial Situations over Time.
Note. 1. Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with household income were measured
on a scale from 1 (Not at all satisfied) to 5 (Completely satisfied). 2. Number of reverse mortgage
borrowers was 109 (2010), 112 (2012), 100 (2014), and 92 (2016).
(b) Reverse Mortgage Borrowers’ Financial Strain Over Time.
Note. 1.Financial strain was measured on scale from 1 (no, did not happen) to 4 (yes, very upsetting).
2.Number of reverse mortgage borrowers was 109 (2010), 112 (2012), 100 (2014), and 92 (2016).
(c) Reverse Mortgage Borrowers’ Difficulty Paying Bills Over Time.
Note. 1. Difficulty paying bills: measured on a scale from 1 (Not at all difficult) to 5 (Completely
difficult). 2. Number of reverse mortgage borrowers was 109 (2010), 112 (2012), 100 (2014), and
92 (2016).
Figure 4.1: Reverse Mortgage Borrowers’ Financial Situations Over Time.
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ing scale, average financial strain in 2010 was 2.02, which dropped to 1.97 in 2012. Strain
level increased to 2.18 in 2014, followed by a decrease to 1.90 in 2016. Finally, reverse
mortgage borrowers’ difficulty paying bills was shown in Figure 4.1c. Over four waves, on
a 1-5 scale, difficulty paying bills experienced a steady decrease, from 2.39 in 2010 to 2.25
in 2016.
The next analysis procedure was to compare reverse mortgage borrowers’ financial situ-
ations before and after taking the loan. Figures 4.2a –4.2c showed differences in satisfaction
and liquidity constraint. Figure 4.2a showed changes in two satisfaction domains resulting
from reverse mortgage. Average of all pre- and post- reverse mortgage waves was taken.
The figure showed that satisfaction with financial situation and with household income both
increased after using the loan. With financial situation, satisfaction rose from 2.93 to 3.23;
and, for income, satisfaction increased from 2.63 to 3.00. Not surprisingly, financial strain
decreased after taking a reverse mortgage, from 2.20 to 1.80 (Figure 4.2b). Difficulty pay-
ing bills (Figure 4.2c) fell from 2.57 to 2.11 after use of reverse mortgage.
Table 4.3 showed results from fixed-effects regression using a categorical predictor
of mortgage status: had no mortgage, had traditional mortgage and had reverse mort-
gage. Model 1 estimated satisfaction with financial situation. “Had reverse mortgage”
(marginally) increased satisfaction of overall financial situation by 0.45 (p = .062) com-
pared with the mortgage-free group. Coefficients of non-housing equity and annual income
were 0.04 (p < .001) and 0.058 (p < .001), respectively, indicating that additional
1% non-housing equity and income corresponded to 0.0004 and 0.0005 increases in in-
8On a 1 (not at all satisfied) to 5 (completely satisfied) scale. Due to level-log relationship between
satisfaction scale and non-housing equity or income, coefficient was interpreted as “coefficient /100.” Income
as an example, was 0.05/100, meaning that a 1% increase in income raised satisfaction by 0.0005.
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(a) Financial Situations Before and After Use of Reverse Mortgage.
Note. 1. n = 30. 2. Average of before- and after-waves was used. 3. Satisfaction with financial
situation was measured on a scale from 1 (Not at all satisfied) to 5 (Completely satisfied).
(b) Financial Strain.
Note. 1. n = 30 2. Average of before- and after-waves was used. 3. Financial strain was measured
on a scale from 1 (No, did not happen) to 4 (Yes, very upsetting).
(c) Difficulty Paying Bills.
Note. 1. n = 28 2. Average of before- and after-waves was used. 3. Difficulty paying bills: measured
on a scale from 1 (Not at all difficult) to 5 (Completely difficult).
Figure 4.2: Financial Situations Before and After Using Reverse Mortgages.
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come satisfaction scale. Having health insurance increased financial satisfaction by 0.24
(p < .001).
Model 2 estimated satisfaction with household income9. Compared with no-mortgage
counterparts, having a reverse mortgage increased income satisfaction by 0.68 (p = .006).
Similarly, regarding satisfaction with overall financial situation, non-housing equity and
income increased income satisfaction by 0.0004 (p < .001) and 0.0006 (p < .001),
respectively. Having health insurance also increased income satisfaction by 0.16 (p =
.007). Financial strain10 was estimated in Model 3. Compared with the no-mortgage group,
using a reverse mortgage decreased financial strain by 0.69 (p = .001). Age group 70-
79, compared with cohorts ages 62-69, related to a 0.06 reduction in financial strain (p =
.041). Each 1% increase in non-housing equity and income also reduced financial strain,
by 0.0004 (p < .001) and 0.0003 (p = .008), respectively. Financial strain decreased
by 0.12 (p = .018) if respondents had health insurance. Model 4 used “difficulty paying
bills11” as the dependent variable. Compared with mortgage-free respondents, a reverse
mortgage reduced difficulty by 0.74 (p = .001). In addition, difficulty decreased by
0.0004 (p < .001) as non-housing equity and income increased 1 %. Health insurance
alleviated difficulty paying bills by 0.22 (p < .001).
9Measured on a 1 (not at all satisfied) to 5 (completely satisfied) scale.
10Measured on a 1 (did not happen) to 4 (very upsetting) scale.
11Measured on a 1 (not at all difficult) to 5 (completely difficult) scale.
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Table 4.4 showed regressions using the binary variable of whether having a reverse
mortgage predicted satisfaction and liquidity constraint. In Model 1, similar to Table 4.3,
satisfaction with financial situation was marginally related to having a reverse mortgage
when compared with non-reverse mortgagors, increasing by 0.46 (p = .054). In addi-
tion, financial satisfaction was also positively related to non-housing equity and income.
Each 1% increase in non-housing equity and income led to 0.0004 (p < .001) and 0.0006
(p < .001) increase in satisfaction scale, respectively. Health insurance predicted a 0.20
(p = .001) increase in financial satisfaction. Model 2 estimated satisfaction with house-
hold income, showing that, comparedwith respondents having no reversemortgage, reverse
mortgage borrowers increased income satisfaction by 0.69 (p = .005). An adverse predic-
tor was “divorced or separated,” which reduced income satisfaction by 0.32 (p = .022).
Similar to previous models, adding 1% in non-housing equity and in income increased in-
come satisfaction by 0.0004 (p = .001) and 0.0006 (p < .001) on 1-5 measuring scale.
Having health insurance promoted income satisfaction by 0.13 (p = .041). Model 3 used
financial strain as the dependent variable, suggesting that a reverse mortgage reduced strain
by 0.69 (p = .001). Consistent with Model 2, divorce or separation increased financial
strain by 0.34 (p = .004). However, financial strain was reduced by 0.0005 (p < .001)
and 0.0003 (p = .021), respectively, as non-housing equity and income rose by 1%. Fi-
nally, Model 4 estimated difficulty paying bills, highlighting that using a reverse mortgage
reduced difficulty by 0.77 (p < .001). Furthermore, difficulty also decreased by 0.0004
(p < .001) and 0.0005 (p < .001) with 1% increase in non-housing equity and income.
Having health insurance was associated with a 0.21 decrease (p < .001) in difficulty
paying bills.
102
T
ab
le
4
.4
:
Im
p
ac
t
o
f
R
ev
er
se
M
o
rt
g
ag
e
o
n
F
in
an
ci
al
S
it
u
at
io
n
s:
F
ix
ed
-E
ff
ec
ts
E
st
im
at
io
n
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
3
M
o
d
el
4
(n
=
1
0
,1
5
9
)
(n
=
1
0
,1
4
2
)
(n
=
1
0
,0
6
0
)
(n
=
1
0
,1
4
7
)
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
w
it
h
F
in
an
ci
al
w
it
h
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
F
in
an
ci
al
S
tr
ai
n
D
if
fi
cu
lt
y
S
it
u
at
io
n
In
co
m
e
P
ay
in
g
B
il
ls
V
ar
ia
b
le
C
o
ef
se
p
C
o
ef
se
p
C
o
ef
se
p
C
o
ef
se
p
H
ad
re
v
er
se
m
o
rt
g
ag
e
0
.4
6
0
.2
4
.0
5
4
0
.6
9
0
.2
5
.0
0
5
-0
.6
9
0
.2
1
.0
0
1
-0
.7
7
0
.2
2
<
.0
0
1
A
g
e
g
ro
u
p
7
0
-7
9
0
.0
6
0
.3
5
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
.4
6
9
-0
.0
5
0
.0
3
.1
0
6
-0
.0
3
0
.0
3
.2
6
5
8
0
+
-0
.0
2
0
.0
6
.6
9
8
-0
.0
5
0
.0
6
.4
2
0
-0
.0
9
0
.0
5
.0
7
2
-0
.0
8
0
.0
5
.0
7
3
M
ar
it
al
st
at
u
s
D
iv
o
rc
ed
/s
ep
ar
at
ed
-0
.1
6
0
.1
3
.2
2
8
-0
.3
2
0
.1
4
.0
2
2
0
.3
4
0
.1
2
.0
0
4
0
.1
7
0
.1
1
.1
4
1
W
id
o
w
ed
0
.0
7
0
.0
6
.2
7
8
0
.0
4
0
.0
7
.5
1
3
0
.0
6
0
.0
6
.2
8
9
-0
.0
6
0
.0
5
.3
0
2
N
ev
er
m
ar
ri
ed
0
.0
3
0
.3
1
.9
1
5
0
.0
3
0
.3
4
.9
2
0
-0
.2
2
0
.2
9
.4
5
0
-0
.0
5
0
.2
8
.8
6
7
S
el
f-
ra
te
d
h
ea
lt
h
-0
.0
3
0
.0
2
.1
3
2
-0
.0
1
0
.0
2
.6
4
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
.4
6
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
.4
8
2
H
ad
h
ea
lt
h
in
su
ra
n
ce
0
.2
0
0
.0
6
.0
0
1
0
.1
3
0
.0
6
.0
4
1
-0
.0
6
0
.0
5
.2
9
6
-0
.2
1
0
.0
5
<
.0
0
1
N
o
n
-h
o
u
si
n
g
eq
u
it
y
(l
o
g
)
0
.0
4
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
0
.0
4
0
.0
1
.0
0
1
-0
.0
5
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
-0
.0
4
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
In
co
m
e
(l
o
g
)
0
.0
6
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
0
.0
6
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
-0
.0
3
0
.0
1
.0
2
1
-0
.0
5
0
.0
1
<
.0
0
1
C
o
n
st
an
t
2
.4
3
0
.2
1
<
.0
0
1
2
.3
6
0
.2
2
<
.0
0
1
2
.3
6
0
.1
9
<
.0
1
0
2
.8
3
0
.1
8
<
.0
0
1
R
2
(o
v
er
al
l)
0
.0
7
4
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
8
9
N
o
te
.
1
.
F
o
u
r
b
ia
n
n
u
al
w
av
es
o
f
2
0
1
0
,
2
0
1
2
,
2
0
1
4
,
an
d
2
0
1
6
w
er
e
u
se
d
to
fo
rm
th
e
p
an
el
d
at
a.
2
.
S
am
p
le
w
er
e
h
o
m
eo
w
n
er
s
ag
ed
6
2
+
.
3
.
R
ef
er
en
ce
g
ro
u
p
s
w
er
e
h
ad
n
o
re
v
er
se
m
o
rt
g
ag
e,
ag
e
g
ro
u
p
o
f
6
2
-6
9
,
m
ar
ri
ed
,
an
d
h
ad
n
o
h
ea
lt
h
in
su
ra
n
ce
.
103
4.7 Discussion
This study uses four waves of the HRS panel data (2010-2016) to investigate the impact
of reverse mortgages on senior homeowners’ financial satisfaction and liquidity constraint.
Two satisfaction domains and two aspects of liquidity constraint are examined, including
satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with household income, as well as fi-
nancial strain and difficulty paying bills. Findings indicate that using a reverse mortgage
is profoundly related to older homeowners’ increased financial and income satisfaction.
Older people’s liquidity constrains also diminishes after taking a reverse mortgage, shown
as reduced difficulty paying bills and less financial strain. Current reverse mortgage studies
are conducted primarily using macroeconomic data from the market perspective to show its
benefits [92]. Our results from a borrower’s point of view enrich the literature, suggesting
that, in addition to the financial advantage of reduced liquidity strain, reverse mortgages
also have a psychological impact through an individual’s perception of enhanced finan-
cial wellbeing. Moreover, this study augments the latest descriptive work devoted to mean
comparisons in financial variables before and after using a reverse mortgage [87]. Fixed-
effects models in our work identify reverse mortgages as a prominent factor to explain
higher satisfaction, and meanwhile, ascertain and quantify incremental changes in satisfac-
tion attributed to reverse mortgages.
Hypotheses postulating that a reverse mortgage likely increases satisfaction and reduces
liquidity strain are both supported. Specifically, higher financial satisfaction, higher income
satisfaction, less financial strain and less difficulty paying bills are ascribed to using a re-
verse mortgage. Aside from these fundamental findings, there are a few important points
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to make. First, four regression models indicate that non-housing equity promotes finan-
cial and income satisfaction, reducing strain and financial difficulty. As a reminder, non-
housing equity is measured as the sum of balance in savings and investment accounts. This
suggests that, controlling for reverse mortgage, financial assets by themselves play a vital
role in older people’s financial wellbeing [78]. Therefore, despite availability of reverse
mortgages in the financial market, wealth accumulation as a momentous financial task in
household resource management may always be a priority.
Second, overall age group as a categorical variable does not have a statistically signif-
icant impact on financial satisfaction or strain. We further test regression models on three
subsamples consisting of respondents ages 62-69, 70-79 and 80+, revealing that the finan-
cial situation of respondents age 80 and above is statistically improved after taking a reverse
mortgage. For example, financial satisfaction measured on 1-5 scale increases by 1.3312 for
those who take reverse mortgages; financial strain measured on 1-4 scale reduces by 1.9313.
This novel finding delivers an important message, narrowing the age range likely to obtain
the most financial and psychological benefits from using a reverse mortgage. Recall that
one concern about using reverse mortgages is early equity exhaustion [111]. This finding
suggests that postponing a reverse mortgage until one’s late 70’s or early 80’s may help
prevent unnecessary equity depletion and obtain financial benefit from the loan.
Aside from expounding the impact from reverse mortgages to promote seniors’ finan-
cial security, we also identify three groups of individuals who are particularly at risk for
financial vulnerability even if they may be eligible for reverse mortgages. First, having
12p = .045
13p = .001
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health insurance predicts higher financial satisfaction and lower strain after controlling for
using reverse mortgages. A closer examination indicates that this impact holds true only
if a respondent has Medicare or Medicaid; using privately-purchased health insurance, ac-
counting for approximately 10% in our sample, does not show an effect. This finding infers
that using government health insurance14 promotes an older person’s financial stability and
liquidity constraint, possibly due to affordable premiums and coverage of the plan. Thus,
older people whose health plans are unaffordable, and who have limited coverage, are more
susceptible to financial strain even though they may choose a reverse mortgage to cover
living expenses.
Next, across four dependent variables, higher household income consistently improves
financial wellbeing. However, when income is below the median income in our reverse-
mortgagor sample, $26,184, reverse mortgage does not show any impact on improved sat-
isfaction or alleviated financial strain. Put another way, a reverse mortgage does not help
financial situations for “the poorest of the poor.” According to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services [35], the federal poverty line (FPL) for a household of two
is $16,02015. Given our sample, only when an older person’s household income exceeds
150% of the FPL would a reverse mortgage loan enhance his financial health. In other
words, reverse mortgages may not save senior homeowners from tight budgets when their
income barely meets the base level for a minimally acceptable standard of living.
Finally, controlling for reverse mortgage, divorce or marital separation reduces income
satisfaction, adding financial strains. That is, single households are more vulnerable to
14In 2016, Medicare Part B monthly premium is $121.8 for people who file an individual tax return with
income lower than $85,000 [22].
1526,184/16,020 = 1.63
106
financial instability and budget constraint, which is consistent with findings in previous
studies [43]. For seniors living alone, a reverse mortgage provides additional income. On
the other hand, to abide by the loan contract, the borrower has to occupy the residence;
otherwise, they must begin repaying the loan. Nevertheless, as part of living arrangements
in later years, seniors tend to move to nursing homes or community apartments [87], and
thus are ineligible for reverse mortgages. Therefore, seniors living in single households
may need extra attention on their financial wellbeing.
Taken together, this study provides evidence for increased financial wellbeing resulting
from reverse mortgages, with specifics on individual characteristics suggesting who may
and may not attain such benefits. This study would be improved, however, if addressing
the following aspects. First, all homeowners age 62+ considered (N = 13,231), there are
215 unique reverse mortgage borrowers, constituting 1.6% of the sample, which is under-
representative of the general population of reverse mortgagors of 2.1% in 2011 [92].
Second, satisfaction domains are measured using LB questionnaire, a survey using sub-
samples from core HRS face-to-face interviews, resulting in reduced sample size from core
HRS in all waves. Combining the above two aspects, reverse mortgagors having responses
on, and showing changes in, satisfaction and liquidity constraints are limited. Across four
waves, a total of 687 responses contain somewhere between 120 – 160 responses showing
changes in dependent variables, which are then usable in fixed-effects estimates. This range
of sample size, although small, meets the minimum number of responses recommended for
regression analysis [49].
Finally, a few factors if added to the model would improve its estimation. For example,
type of payment, especially lump sum payment, which usually is an enticement to potential
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borrowers, affects borrowing decisions. However, the HRS does not contain such informa-
tion. Another example is occurrence of health shocks, a prominent factor shown to influ-
ence the decision to use a reverse mortgage. Although relevant measures are available in
the HRS, when combined with reverse mortgage measures, there are insufficient responses
for valid estimates.
4.8 Implication
This paper provides evidence of reverse mortgages’ impact on improved financial satis-
faction and alleviated liquidity strain. In addition, we find that benefit potentials of reverse
mortgages tend tomaximize when homeowners reach age 80 andwhen household income is
at least 150% of the FPL. In two ways, educators and policymakers committed to improving
seniors’ financial health may put the above findings into practice.
First, for educators, age 75 may be used as a criterion to assess risk of early equity ex-
haustion. Equity depletion at an old age is nearly irreversible, so any decision to release
home equity should be handled with caution. Given longevity, it is noteworthy for coun-
selors to clarify ramifications of early equity withdrawal. This is especially needed when
the biggest increase in taking reverse mortgages is seen at age 62, the youngest eligible
age [92], imposing perils of using up housing capital too soon. Along with the suggestion
to postpone a reverse mortgage to an older age, counselors may also offer advice on supple-
menting income in the meantime: for example, younger seniors may take a part-time job
if physical condition allows. By doing so, older people in need of additional income may
reduce the possibility of or delay the occurrence of unnecessary depletion of equity.
Second, the fact that reverse mortgages do not help “the poorest of the poor” indicates
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an imperative need for policymakers to ensure financial security among low-income se-
niors. That is, when income barely meets basic living needs, liquidating home equity does
not solve one’s problems; not to mention that eventually housing capital will probably be
gone. Of course, the Social Security system serves the function of maintaining older adults’
minimum standard of living. Apart from Social Security benefits, other strategies to assist
low-income elder homeowners may be taken. Take the example of the homestead exemp-
tion statute, in which, upon approval, home property tax is reduced through deducting the
exempted amount: the eligible age for the homestead exemption could be lowered from
65 to 62, which is also the minimum age to take a reverse mortgage and an age where the
biggest increase is seen in use of reverse mortgages. States that do not offer the homestead
exemption16 may consider implementing similar strategies to reduce property tax liability
and to protect low-income seniors from losing their homes, especially when many home-
owners take reverse mortgages to cover property tax [67].
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
16States that do not offer homestead protection include New Jersey and Pennsylvania. States that offer the
exemption include Kentucky and Kansas.
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CHAPTER 5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE STUDIES
This dissertation focuses on American middle-aged and older adults’ mortgage loans
and examines the impact of mortgage debt in later years on their financial security. Three
specific issues related to mortgage loans are investigated: 1) whether lack of retirement
preparedness relates to larger loan amounts at retirement; 2) whether a health shock reduces
likelihood of mortgage payoff; and 3) whether a reverse mortgage loan increases financial
satisfaction in retirement.
Evidence is clear that managing mortgage loan debt is a critical component in building
lifetime wealth and enhancing financial satisfaction in later years. The first study indicates
that individuals with at least some preparation are less likely to carry mortgage debts into
retirement. Even if they cannot pay downmortgage debts before or at retirement, remaining
mortgage balances tend to be smaller with higher preparedness level. Study 2 finds that a
health shock reduces likelihood of mortgage payoff. Estimation on time to payoff shows
that given same health, older mortgagors are approaching mortgage maturation at a slower
speed than younger counterparts. As suggested by Study 3, when liquidity is constrained,
reverse mortgages relieve financial strain. That is, under limited resources, a senior may
liquidate home equity in order to increase financial satisfaction.
In a nutshell, this dissertation delivers the following messages. In order to achieve
financial security in retirement, first be prepared to manage mortgage debts—the earlier,
the better. Second, make efforts to pay off mortgage debts before health shocks occur—the
older a person is, the more difficult it would be for them to pay down mortgage loans.
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Finally, to shield against financial strain in later years, home equity may be released to
supplement income; and a reverse mortgage is one possibility to consider.
Specifically, the first study addresses mortgage loan debt among middle-aged and older
Americans by examining whether having mortgage loans in later years results from un-
preparedness or under-preparedness for retirement. A major finding from Study 1 is that
retirement preparedness promotes mortgage payoff: people with at least some preparation
for retirement are more likely to pay down their mortgages before onset of or at retirement.
In addition, although some people are not able to pay off mortgage debts and therefore carry
mortgage loans into retirement, when they have some level of retirement preparation, their
loan-to-value ratios tend to be smaller. That is, given the same home price, older people
with higher retirement preparation have smaller mortgage balances. It is worth noting that
preparation is only prominent for pre-retirees in mortgage debt management, but not for the
retired. Understandably, people who are not retired yet still have time to make financial
adjustments and to implement mortgage management strategies as part of their retirement
planning. After they are retired, preparation is of little help in alleviating mortgage debt
burden. Therefore, apart from evidence on preparation and its impact on mortgage loan
debt, another highlight in the findings is the importance of planning early.
Next, older people’s declining health and increasing healthcare costs are two factors
exacerbating financial hardship when wealth is limited and they have mortgage debt. As
people age, demand for healthcare increases, with higher possibilities of experiencing health
shocks. One ramification is financial shocks from large out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Under this circumstance, when older people have mortgage debt to pay, we need deeper
understanding of how their health may influence their mortgage payments.
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In line with health, the second study in this dissertation examines mortgage payments
in association with middle-aged and older Americans’ health: how does health affect like-
lihood of mortgage payoff, and what is the expected payoff time by health conditions? A
novel finding from Study 2 is that mortgage payoff is postponed when experiencing health
shocks. The extent of postponement depends on a mortgagor’s age, controlling for other
predictors: when health shocks occur, the older a person is, the longer the delay. This re-
sult testifies that older mortgagors are more vulnerable to financial insecurity from health
problems, stressing the importance of paying off mortgage debt as early as possible. In ad-
dition, health shocks have lingering effects on mortgage payments. Shocks occurring years
ago still have an impact on the likelihood of paying a mortgage off today, possibly from
expenses for health maintenance or related chronic illnesses.
The third study focuses on reverse mortgages, a type of loan available for homeowners
age 62 and older, allowing access to home equity. While the first two studies aim to reduce
mortgage loan debt by examining the role of preparedness and impact of health, Study 3
explores whether taking a reverse mortgage helps increase financial satisfaction and reduce
liquidity constraint. Theoretically, equity in later years is a supplement to limited resources,
helping to sustain quality of life by transferring assets accumulated in working years to
times when income is low. In practice, understanding the effect of reverse mortgages on
senior borrowers’ financial situations is important for three reasons. First, older adults have
demand for home equity. Second, equity, if not carefully handled, may be exhausted. Third,
when used rationally, equity brings benefits.
Therefore, Study 3 investigates whether enhanced financial satisfaction results from a
reversemortgage, and the extent of satisfaction increase. Results identify reversemortgages
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as a prominent factor to explain higher satisfaction, and also reduced financial strain and dif-
ficulty paying bills. This is one of the few studies showing the impact of reverse mortgages
from the perspective of the borrowers’ financial wellbeing, quantifying the magnitude of
impact. Furthermore, this study contributes to reverse mortgage literature by identifying
three groups of people who may not attain these benefits: seniors younger than age 80,
single-household individuals and elder people whose income is below 150% of the federal
poverty line. These findings should be put into practice for better financial outcomes: in
counseling sessions, potential reverse mortgage borrowers may be informed on 1) whether
they should take a reverse mortgage; and 2) at what age they should take the loan.
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
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CHAPTER 6. LIMITATION
This dissertation provides evidence on enhancing middle-aged and older Americans’
financial security through mortgage management. Three studies navigate factors of retire-
ment preparedness, health impact and use of reverse mortgages for better financial health.
Despite the important findings, the following issues, if addressed, will improve the three
studies.
First, this dissertation focuses on mortgage debt; so accurate dollar values of the home
presently, mortgage balance, and thus home equity and loan-to-value ratio are important.
HRS uses self-reported dollar values on measures of the above financial variables, likely to
be different from actual dollar values: for example, numbers reflected on a bank statement.
Second, the concept “mortgage payoff” is used to stand for transitioning from the status
of “Have a mortgage” to “Have no mortgage.” However, status of “Have no mortgage”
may result from either completion of payment or from foreclosure because of delinquency.
These two mechanisms linking to “mortgage payoff” are not distinguished in this disserta-
tion. Future studies may consider identifying reasons behind “mortgage payoff” for more
informative results.
Next, in studying health impact on likelihood of mortgage payoff, dollar values of out-
of-pocket expenses are not factored into survival analysis models. When adding the predic-
tor of out-of-pocket expenses, due to missing responses, no mortgage payoff is observed.
Since observation is a crucial component for survival analysis to build models, without
observed payoff while having only censored data, model building is rendered impossible.
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Finally, reverse mortgages are shown to improve financial satisfaction and reduce fi-
nancial constraint. Factors shown to influence mortgage decisions may be added in regres-
sion models. For example, experience of health shock, large consumer debt, or decease of
spouse. When adding these variables in this study, however, responses are too few to obtain
valid estimates. There are two reasons. First, only 1.6 percent of homeowners age 62 in
the sample use reverse mortgages. Second, measure of financial satisfaction is conducted
on only a subsample of HRS core interviews. Considering the above two facts about data,
model building is limited. Future studies may consider using larger sample on reverse mort-
gage borrowers or keeping track of the same borrowers for a longer period, to obtain more
responses for model building.
Copyright© Qun Zhang, 2019.
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Appendix A
(a) 1a. Percent of Near-Retirees Starting with No Preparedness
Age 50-54
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total
(n =
2,464)
(n =
1,503)
(n = 622) (n =
3,499)
(n =
2,109)
(n = 804) (n =
11,001)
41.6 40.8 47.0 43.1 40.4 42.7 42.1
(b) 1b. Percent of Near-Retirees Starting with No Preparedness Showing No Increase in Prepared-
ness Over Time
Age 50-54
(n =
1,026)
(n = 613) (n = 292) (n =
1,509)
(n = 851) (n = 343) (n =
4,634)
43.7 41.9 43.5 56.5 57.5 79.0 52.7
(a) 2a. Percent of Near-Retirees Starting with No Preparedness
Age 55-60
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total
(n =
2,871)
(n =
2,991)
(n =
3,022)
(n =
4,282)
(n =
4,378)
(n =
4,292)
(n =
21,836)
41.6 37.0 36.0 39.2 37.6 37.9 38.2
(b) 2b. Percent of Near-Retirees Starting with No Preparedness Showing No Increase in Prepared-
ness Over Time
Age 55-60
(n =
1,193)
(n =
1,107)
(n =
1,089)
(n =
1,677)
(n =
1,645)
(n =
1,626)
(n =
8,337)
43.0 37.6 38.8 47.6 48.1 50.3 45.1
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Appendix B
Ever Used Reverse Mortgage
N = 215
Started with No Reverse Mortgage Started with
Reverse Mortgage
n = 91 n = 124
Had DV before using reverse mortgage No DV value
before using
reverse mortgage
n = 66 n = 25
Had DV value after
using reverse
mortgage
No DV value after
using reverse
mortgage
n = 28 n = 38
Note. Panel sample had 215 unique reverse mortgage borrowers. DV = dependent
variable. This table used ”Difficulty Paying Bills” as an example.
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